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As the global population grows and incomes in poor 
countries rise, so too, will the demand for food, placing additional pres-
sure on sustainable food production. Climate change adds a further chal-
lenge, as changes in temperature and precipitation threaten agricultural 
productivity and the capacity to feed the world’s population. This study 
assesses how serious the danger to food security might be and suggests 
some steps policymakers can take to remedy the situation. 
Using various modeling techniques, the authors project 15 different 
future scenarios for food security through 2050. Each scenario involves 
an alternative combination of potential population and income growth 
and climate change. The authors also examine the specific test case of a 
hypothetical extended drought in South Asia, to demonstrate the possible 
effects of increased climate variability on a particular world region. They 
conclude that the negative effects of climate change on food security can 
be counteracted by broad-based economic growth—particularly improved 
agricultural productivity—and robust international trade in agricultural 
products to offset regional shortages. In pursuit of these goals, policymak-
ers should increase public investment in land, water, and nutrient use and 
maintain relatively free international trade. This inquiry into the future of 
food security should be of use to policymakers and others concerned with 
the impact of climate change on international development.
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Foreword
By 2050, the world’s population is likely to reach 9 billion. Most of these 
people are expected to live in developing countries and have higher incomes 
than currently is the case, which will result in increased demand for food. In 
the best of circumstances, the challenge of meeting this demand in a sustain-
able manner will be enormous. When one takes into account the effects of 
climate change (higher temperatures, shifting seasons, more frequent and 
extreme weather events, flooding, and drought) on food production, that 
challenge grows even more daunting. The 2010 floods in Pakistan and exces-
sive heat and drought in Russia that resulted in wildfires and a grain embargo 
are harbingers of a troubled future for global food security.
This research monograph follows the 2009 release of IFPRI’s widely read 
food  policy  report,  Climate  Change:  Impact  on  Agriculture  and  Costs  of 
Adaptation, which used a detailed global agriculture model to analyze crop 
growth under two simulated future climate scenarios. This monograph takes 
advantage of and expands on IFPRI’s cutting-edge climate modeling expertise 
to address the climate change threat in the context of larger food security 
challenges. It provides the most comprehensive analysis to date on the scope 
of climate change as it relates to food security, including who will be most 
affected  and  what  policymakers  can  do  to  facilitate  adaptation.  Building 
on  previous  research  by  IFPRI  and  other  international  organizations,  this 
monograph examines a wider range of plausible economic, demographic, and 
climatic futures than has previously been analyzed.
Using comprehensive empirical analysis, the authors suggest that poli-
cymakers should take into account (1) the value of broad-based sustainable 
development, (2) the power of investments to enhance agricultural produc-
tivity, (3) the importance of an open world trade system, and (4) the need 
for early action on both adaptation and mitigation.  As policymakers in the 
developing world well know, neither food security nor climate change can 
be viewed in isolation. This report will be indispensible to readers trying to 
tackle these inextricably linked issues.
Shenggen Fan
Director General, International Food Policy Research Institutexii
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Summary
The first decade of the 21st century has seen several harbingers of a troubled 
future for global food security. The food price spike of 2008, with its conse-
quent food riots and resulting political changes in several countries, awoke 
the world’s leaders to the re-emergence of this threat to human well-being 
and social harmony. The excessive heat and drought in Russia that led to the 
2010 wildfires and grain embargo, as well as the unprecedented floods in 
Pakistan, signal more trouble ahead. But the warning signs could already be 
seen in the 1990s, as the long-term decline in the number of the world’s poor 
and hungry stalled, and those numbers began to rise.
The seeds for these challenges, both for good and ill, were planted along 
with the Green Revolution crops in the mid-1960s. Dramatic increases in food 
production and land productivity led to complacency about the remaining 
challenges ahead, resulting in reduced public sector investments in agricul-
tural productivity. Population numbers continue their march towards a likely 
9 billion by 2050, while higher incomes in hitherto poor countries will lead 
to increased demand, which in turn puts additional pressures on sustainable 
food production. 
To those already daunting challenges, climate change adds further pres-
sure. Because food production is critically dependent on local temperature 
and  precipitation  conditions,  any  changes  require  farmers  to  adapt  their 
practices,  and  this  adaptation  requires  resources  that  could  be  used  for 
other purposes. Farmers everywhere will need to adapt to climate change. 
For a few, the changes might ultimately be beneficial, but for many farmers 
our analysis points to major challenges to productivity and more difficulties 
in  managing  risk.  The  agricultural  system  as  a  whole  will  have  difficulty 
supplying  adequate  quantities  of  food  to  maintain  constant  real  prices. 
And the challenges extend further: to national governments, to provide the 
supporting policy and infrastructure environment; and to the global trading 
regime,  to  ensure  that  changes  in  comparative  advantage  translate  into 
unimpeded trade flows to balance world supply and demand.
But how big are these challenges, who will be most affected, and what 
could policy makers do to facilitate adaptation? Providing answers to these 
questions is the task of this report. It builds on previous research, examining a 
wider range of plausible futures—economic, demographic, and climate—than xvi   SUMMARY
has previously been analyzed. It also illustrates the key point that neither 
food security nor climate change should be viewed in isolation. 
It must be emphasized that combined biophysical-socioeconomic modeling 
of this detail and extent is still in its infancy. This document provides a status 
report on current research results. As with any large model-based analysis, the 
present study, while breaking new ground in the level of detail it incorporates 
in  its  agricultural-climate  interactions,  is  obliged  to  use  some  simplifying 
assumptions and features, such as the partial equilibrium framework that 
underlies the results presented. Consequently, while the general directions 
deduced from this analysis are likely valid, the specific magnitudes should be 
treated with caution. Furthermore, for the first time, underlying parameters 
and  more  detailed  results  will  be  released  on  a  website  (www.ifpri.org/
climate-change)  that  makes  it  possible  for  interested  parties  to  provide 
detailed comments and critiques of the modeling process and outputs. 
An uncertain future means a range of plausible outcomes. Unlike previous 
research, including our own (for example, Nelson et al. 2009), which relied 
on a single baseline scenario of GDP and population, this research uses three 
combinations of income and population growth: a baseline scenario that is 
“middle of the road”; a pessimistic scenario that, while plausible, is likely 
to result in more negative outcomes for human well-being; and an optimistic 
scenario that would result in more positive outcomes. Another advance is that 
each of these three overall scenarios are subjected to four plausible climate 
futures that range from slightly to substantially wetter and hotter on average 
than the current climate. We then compare these four climate futures with 
a  fifth  scenario,  of  perfect  climate  mitigation—that  is,  a  continuation  of 
today’s climate into the future. Three overall scenarios, under five climate 
scenarios, result in 15 perspectives on the future that encompass a wide 
range  of  plausible  outcomes.  Using  the  baseline  scenario,  we  experiment 
with  a  variety  of  crop  productivity  enhancement  simulations.  Finally,  we 
present the results of a simulation of an extended drought in South Asia—one 
likely outcome of climate change—to give some perspective on the effects of 
increased climate variability for one part of the world.
Main messages
We draw four sets of main messages from our analysis.
1.   Broad-based economic development is central to improvements in 
human well-being, including sustainable food security and resilience 
to climate change.
Broad-based growth in income is essential to improving human well-being and 
delivering sustainable food security. Families with more resources at their SUMMARY   xvii
disposal are better able to cope with whatever uncertainties mother nature 
or human activities cause. Farming families with higher incomes are able to 
experiment with new technologies and management systems that might be 
costly up-front but offer big productivity and resilience payoffs in the future.
World prices are a useful indicator of the future of agriculture (see Table 
2.2). Rising prices signal the existence of imbalances in supply and demand 
and  growing  resource  scarcity,  driven  either  by  demand  factors  such  as 
growing population and income, or by supply factors such as reduced produc-
tivity due to climate change. Unlike much of the 20th century, when real 
agricultural prices declined, our analysis suggests that real agricultural prices 
will likely increase between now and 2050, the result of growing incomes and 
population as well as the negative productivity effects of climate change. 
The likely price increase ranges from 31.2 percent for rice (in the optimistic 
scenario) to 100.7 percent for maize (in the baseline scenario). With perfect 
mitigation, these price increases would be less: from 18.4 percent for rice in 
the optimistic scenario to 34.1 percent for maize in the pessimistic scenario. 
These still-substantial increases reflect the relentless underlying pressures on 
the world food system, even in the unlikely event that perfect mitigation can 
be achieved (that is, all greenhouse gas emissions are halted and the inertia 
in the climate system can be overcome).
Domestic production combined with international trade flows determine 
domestic food availability; per capita income and domestic prices determine 
the ability of consumers to pay for that food. In our quantitative analysis, 
the average consumer in low-income developing countries today obtains only 
two-thirds of the calories available in the developed countries (Table 2.10). 
With high per capita income growth and perfect climate mitigation, calorie 
availability reaches almost 85 percent of the developed countries by 2050. 
And  in  the  optimistic  scenario,  because  the  poorest  countries  grow  more 
rapidly  between  now  and  2050,  they  catch  up  to  today’s  middle-income 
countries. With the pessimistic overall scenario, however, both calorie avail-
ability and general human well-being declines in all regions.
 Calorie availability is an important component in our metric of human 
well-being—the number of malnourished children under the age of five. This 
number captures some, but certainly not all, of the human suffering that can 
result from the combination of slow economic growth and climate change, 
coupled with inappropriate government policies. Overall, in the optimistic 
scenario, the number of malnourished children in developing countries falls 
by over 45 percent between 2010 and 2050 (Table 2.10). With the pessimistic 
scenario, on the other hand, that number only decreases by about 2 percent. xviii   SUMMARY
The benefits of the optimistic scenario are greatest for the middle-income 
developing countries, which have the greatest share of world population. 
For these countries, the optimistic scenario results in a 50-percent decline 
in the number of malnourished children; in the pessimistic scenario, that 
number still declines, but by only 10 percent. Under the optimistic scenario, 
low-income developing countries show a decline of 37 percent in the number 
of  malnourished  children—but  the  pessimistic  scenario  is  devastating:  the 
number of malnourished children increases by more 18 percent. 
2. Climate change offsets some of the benefits of income growth. 
Climate  change  exacerbates  the  challenges  in  reducing  the  number  of 
malnourished  children,  although  the  effects  are  mitigated  by  economic 
development. For all regions, the negative productivity effects of climate 
change  reduce  food  availability  and  human  well-being.  Climate  change 
results in even higher world prices in 2050 (Table 2.2). It causes an increase 
of between 8.5 and 10.3 percent in the number of malnourished children in 
all developing countries, relative to perfect mitigation (Table 2.10). 
3.   International trade plays an essential role in compensating for various 
climate change effects.
Despite large differences in precipitation amounts and seasonal variation 
across the climate scenarios, the differences in price and other outcomes 
are relatively small. The exception is the dramatic effect on international 
trade flows (Table 2.6). Changes in developed country net cereal exports 
from 2010 to 2050 range from an increase of 5 million metric tons (mt) in 
the perfect mitigation scenario to a decline of almost 140 million mt. This 
is because the global scenarios that are wetter on average are particularly 
dry in the central United States, resulting in much lower 2050 maize and 
soybean production than the drier global scenarios, and therefore resulting 
in reduced exports. 
Trade  flows  can  partially  offset  local  climate  change  productivity 
effects,  allowing  regions  of  the  world  with  positive  (or  less  negative) 
effects to supply those with more negative effects. This important role for 
international trade can be seen in the results for the South Asian drought 
simulation,  which  models  an  extended  drought  beginning  in  2030,  with 
return to normal precipitation in 2040. Substantial increases in trade flows 
soften the blow to Indian consumers. During the drought the region sees 
large increases in imports (or reductions in net exports) of the three key 
commodities, rice, wheat, and maize. These net imports drive world prices 
higher.  Essentially,  other  countries’  producers  and  consumers  help  to SUMMARY   xix
reduce, though certainly not eliminate, the human suffering that a South 
Asian drought would cause.
4.   Properly targeted agricultural productivity investments can mitigate 
the impacts of climate change and enhance sustainable food security.
Increases  in  agricultural  production  are  essential  to  meeting  the  demand 
growth from population and income. While area expansion is still possible in 
some parts of the world, the possibility of negative environmental effects is 
substantial. Agricultural productivity investments make it possible to meet 
that  increased  demand  from  existing  agricultural  land  resources,  while 
reducing  some  of  the  environmental  threats  from  increased  production. 
We looked at five different types of productivity enhancements: an overall 
increase in crop productivity in developing countries of 40 percent relative 
to our baseline assumptions; an increase in commercial maize productivity; 
improvements  in  wheat  and  cassava  productivity  (analyzed  separately)  in 
selected  countries  in  the  developing  world;  and  an  increase  in  irrigation 
efficiency (Table 2.11). 
The overall productivity increase had the greatest effect on human well-
being, reducing the number of malnourished children in 2050 by 16.2 percent 
(or 19.1 million children under 5) relative to the baseline result (Table 4.3). 
Some in the commercial maize industry suggest that commercial maize yields 
can increase by an annual average of 2.5 percent through at least 2030, so 
we simulated a 2 percent increase through 2050. This productivity change 
would affect about 80 percent of world production in 2010. The effects on 
world maize prices are dramatic: prices increase only 12 percent, instead of 
101 percent, between 2010 and 2050. The effect on malnourished children is 
also not insignificant, with a 3.2 percent decline relative to the baseline in 
2050. The effect is larger in the low-income developing countries (a decline 
of 4.8 percent) because maize consumption is relatively more important in 
this group of countries.
The wheat productivity experiment increases productivity to 2 percent 
in selected developing countries that together account for about 40 percent 
of world production in 2010. Because less production is affected than in the 
maize  simulation,  the  outcomes  for  human  well-being  are  less  dramatic, 
with only a 2.2 percent reduction in the number of malnourished children 
in developing countries in 2050 (Table 4.7). The middle-income developing 
countries fare better (a 2.5 percent reduction) than the low-income devel-
oping countries (1.6 percent reduction), because India and China are both 
major  wheat  producers  and  consumers  and  are  included  in  the  group  of 
middle-income developing countries.xx   SUMMARY
Cassava is a particularly important crop for consumers in some low-income 
developing  countries.  It  is  the  fourth  most  important  source  of  calories 
for this group of countries and provides about 8 percent of average daily 
consumption. The simulation increases productivity to 2 percent annually for 
the six top producing countries (Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Thailand) that collectively accounted for over 
60 percent of world production in 2000. While the effect on the number of 
malnourished children is only a 1.1 decline in 2050 for all developing coun-
tries, it is concentrated in the low-income developing countries, where the 
decline is 2.2 percent (Table 4.9).
Finally, we looked at the effects of a 15 percent increase in irrigation effi-
ciency in developing countries. The world’s irrigated area is concentrated in 
South and East Asia. In East Asia, increased precipitation from climate change 
(in most scenarios), along with changing consumer preferences away from 
rice, reduce the need for irrigated area between 2010 and 2050. Therefore, 
any irrigation efficiency improvements there have relatively small effects on 
food production (although they are critical for freeing up water for industrial 
and urban use). In South Asia, however, the benefits of more efficient irriga-
tion are substantial. And for middle income countries as a whole, increased 
irrigation efficiency reduces the number of malnourished children in 2050 
by 0.3 percent, or about 0.3 million children (Table 4.15). In low-income 
developing countries, however, because the share of irrigated area is low, 
the efficiency effect is small, reducing the number of malnourished children 
by only 0.2 percent (0.1 million children).
Beyond 2050
This analysis focuses on the period between 2010 and 2050. Nevertheless, we 
would be remiss if we did not point out the nature of the challenges beyond. 
Although  population  growth  is  slowing  and  likely  to  stop  by  the  mid-21st 
century,  there  will  still  remain  significant  disparities  in  income  between 
poor and rich countries, as well as large numbers of people still living in 
abject poverty. Even in the optimistic scenario, the number of malnourished 
children in 2050 is 76 million to 84 million, depending on climate change 
scenario.
And the climate change threat becomes much more severe after 2050. In 
2050, the increases in mean surface air temperature relative to the late 20th 
century across all scenarios are relatively modest, on the order of 1°C; but 
they diverge dramatically in the ensuing years, with outcomes ranging from 
2°C to 4°C by 2100 (Figure 1.5). And temperature increases over land are 
likely to be higher than these means, which include ocean areas. Yields of 
many more crops will be more severely threatened than in the window from SUMMARY   xxi
today to 2050. Table 5.1 shows the changes in wheat yields from climate 
change in 2030, 2050, and 2080 relative to yields with 2000 climate. With 
the climate change from 2000 to 2030, the yield effects are negative 1.3 
percent to negative 9 percent. By 2050, the decline ranges from 4.2 percent 
to 12 percent. And by 2080, the declines are much greater, ranging from 14.3 
percent to 29 percent.
Our analysis suggests that up to 2050, the challenges from climate change 
are “manageable,” in the sense that well-designed investments in land and 
water  productivity  enhancements  might,  conceivably,  substantially  offset 
the negative effects from climate change. But the challenges of dealing with 
the effects between 2050 and 2080 are likely to be much greater than those 
to 2050. Starting the process of slowing emissions growth today is critical to 




he 2010 Millennium Development Goals report (United Nations 2010) 
highlights the challenges facing the world in addressing the first goal: 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. The poverty target requires 
halving the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day between 
1990 and 2015. That target is unlikely to be met. In 1990, in developing 
regions the share of people in extreme poverty was 46 percent. By 2008, it 
had dropped to 26 percent; but thereafter, the economic crisis that began 
in 2008 caused an increase to an estimated 31 percent. The hunger target—
halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger between 1990 and 
2015—is also unlikely to be met on a global basis, although some individual 
countries  will  achieve  the  target.  The  share  of  malnourished  people  has 
remained essentially constant at about 16 percent since 2000, after declining 
from 20 percent in 1990, and it too is likely to have increased during the 
economic crisis.
If  the  world  is  having  difficulty  meeting  basic  human  needs  now,  the 
challenges in the future loom large. The first decade of the 21st century saw 
several harbingers of a troubled future for global food security. The food 
price spike of 2008, with its consequent food riots and resulting political 
changes in several countries, awoke the world’s leaders to the re-emergence 
of this threat to human well-being and social harmony. The excessive heat 
and drought in Russia that led to the 2010 wildfires and grain embargo, as 
well as the unprecedented floods in Pakistan, signal more trouble ahead. 
But the warning signs could already be seen in the late 20th century, as the 
long-term decline in the number of the world’s poor and hungry came to an 
end and as those numbers began to increase in the 1990s. 
The seeds for these challenges, both for good and ill, were planted along 
with the Green Revolution crops in the mid-1960s. Dramatic increases in food 
production and land productivity led to complacency about the remaining 
challenges ahead, resulting in reduced public sector investments in agricul-
tural productivity. Population numbers continue their march towards a likely 
9 billion by 2050. If we are ultimately successful in reducing poverty, higher 2   CHAPTER 1
incomes in hitherto poor countries will lead to increased demand, which in 
turn means additional pressures on sustainable food production. 
To those already daunting challenges, climate change adds further pres-
sure. Because food production is critically dependent on local temperature 
and  precipitation  conditions,  any  changes  require  farmers  to  adapt  their 
practices, and this adaptation requires resources that could be used for other 
purposes. Farmers everywhere will need to adapt to climate change. For a 
few, the adaptations might be beneficial, but for many farmers our analysis 
points to major challenges to productivity and more difficulties in managing 
risk.  The  agricultural  system  as  a  whole  will  have  difficulty  supplying 
adequate quantities of food to maintain constant real prices. And the chal-
lenges extend further: to national governments to provide the supporting 
policy and infrastructure environment; and to the global trading regime to 
ensure  that  changes  in  comparative  advantage  translate  into  unimpeded 
trade flows to balance world supply and demand.
This report provides an end-of-decade assessment of the challenges to 
global food security through 2050. It undertakes a detailed analysis of global 
agricultural  prospects,  incorporating  quantitative  scenarios  of  economic 
and demographic futures and the threats that climate change poses. The 
Millennium  Ecosystem  Assessment’s  Ecosystems  and  Human  Well-being: 
Scenarios, Volume 2, provides a useful definition of scenarios:
Scenarios are plausible, challenging, and relevant stories about how the future 
might unfold, which can be told in both words and numbers. Scenarios are 
not forecasts, projections, predictions, or recommendations. They are about 
envisioning future pathways and accounting for critical uncertainties. (Raskin 
et al. 2005: 36)
Scenario  development  typically  involves  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
assessments. Qualitative perspectives make it possible to evaluate a wide 
range of potentially plausible outcomes for which there are no easily quan-
tifiable expectations. Quantitative scenarios provide informative detail on 
magnitudes for some of the outcomes. Quantitative scenarios thus provide 
a  consistency  check  on  the  plausibility  of  qualitative  scenario  outcomes. 
They also allow for exploration of complex interactions that cannot easily be 
traced in a qualitative scenario.
This  report  builds  on  previous  research,  examining  a  wider  range  of 
plausible futures—economic, demographic, and climate—than has previously 
been analyzed. It also illustrates the key point that neither food security nor 
climate change should be viewed in isolation.INTRoDUCTIoN   3
An uncertain future means a range of plausible outcomes. Unlike previous 
research, including our own (for example, Nelson et al. 2009) which relied 
on a single baseline scenario of GDP and population, this research uses three 
combinations of income and population growth: a baseline scenario that is 
“middle of the road”; a pessimistic scenario that, while plausible, is likely 
to result in more negative outcomes for human well-being; and an optimistic 
scenario  that  would  result  in  more  positive  outcomes.  Another  advance 
is that each of the three overall scenarios are subjected to four plausible 
climate futures that range from slightly to substantially wetter and hotter 
on average than the current climate. We then compare these four climate 
futures with a fifth scenario, of perfect climate mitigation—that is, a continu-
ation of today’s climate into the future. Three overall scenarios, under five 
climate scenarios, result in 15 perspectives on the future that encompass a 
wide range of plausible outcomes.
Finally,  several  simulations  are  undertaken  to  provide  a  perspective 
on possible policy and program innovations that might make more likely a 
sustainable future for food and farming. 
It must be emphasized that combined biophysical-socioeconomic modeling 
of this detail and extent is still in early stages of development. This docu-
ment provides a status report on current research results. As with any large 
model-based analysis, the present study, while breaking new ground in the 
level  of  detail  it  incorporates  in  its  agricultural-climate  interactions,  is 
obliged to use some simplifying assumptions and features, such as the partial 
equilibrium framework that underlies the results presented. Consequently, 
while the general directions deduced from this analysis are likely valid, the 
specific magnitudes should be treated with caution. For the first time that 
we are aware of, underlying parameters and more detailed results will be 
released on a website (www.ifpri.org/climate-change) that makes it possible 
for interested parties to provide detailed comments on the data, modeling 
and outputs and provide inputs to improve the process.
The Choice of Modeling Environment
The  set  of  driver  variables  that  can  be  considered  is  constrained  by  the 
modeling  environment.  Two  classes  of  models—partial  equilibrium  and 
general equilibrium—have been used in this kind of analysis previously.
Partial Equilibrium (PE) Agricultural Sector Models 
PE  models  represent  the  agricultural  sector  in  great  detail,  at  the  cost 
of  simplified  modeling  of  relationships  with  other  parts  of  the  economy. 
The strength of this modeling approach is its detailed specification of the 4   CHAPTER 1
agricultural sector. The food side of these models generally uses a system 
of supply and demand elasticities incorporated into a series of linear and 
nonlinear equations, which reflect the underlying production and demand 
functions.  World  agricultural  commodity  prices  are  determined  annually 
at levels that clear international markets. Demand is a function of prices, 
income, and population growth. The supply side of the model is constrained 
by biophysical information on a regional level (for example, land or water 
availability), using information at the crop level. PE modeling approaches 
allow 1) consistent and clearly defined relations among all variables at the 
detailed commodity level; 2) a projection into the future of the structure 
of interrelationships among variables consistent with past relationships; 3) 
changes  in  complex  cross-relationships  among  variables  over  time;  4)  the 
simultaneous interaction of many variables; and 5) an organized and consis-
tent treatment of massive numbers of variables and large amounts of data 
(McCalla and Revoredo 2001). 
Quantities as well as values are modeled, with a detailed representation 
of agriculture (including spatially) that incorporates management systems, 
technologies, and water modeling. With commodity detail, the PE approach 
supports more detailed modeling of productivity shocks and land use changes. 
PE models can be linked to more spatially and temporally disaggregated crop 
models  that  provide  detailed  specification  of  crop  biology  and  responses 
to  changes  in  climate  that  affect  water  availability  and  temperature.  In 
principle,  this  approach  provides  a  detailed  structural  specification  of 
agricultural technologies, providing a foundation for the commodity supply 
functions  in  the PE model. other  approaches,  such  as the use  of smooth 
production functions or cost functions to support supply functions, cannot 
capture the potential response of agriculture to climate/weather shocks. 
Two main weaknesses of PE models are (1) that there are no feedback 
effects  to  other  sectors;  and  (2)  that  welfare  effects  are  not  explicitly 
measured, but are extrapolated from reduced form estimates based on areas 
under supply and demand curves. 
Global Computable Equilibrium (CGE) Models
CGE models are widely used as an analytical framework to study economic 
issues  of  national,  regional,  and  global  dimension.  CGE  models  provide 
a representation of national economies and the trade relations between 
economies.  CGE  models  are  specifically  concerned  with  resource  alloca-
tion  issues:  that  is,  where  the  allocation  of  factors  of  production  over 
alternative uses is affected by certain policies or exogenous developments. 
International  trade  is  typically  an  area  where  such  induced  effects  are 
important  consequences  of  policy  choices.  These  models  provide  an INTRoDUCTIoN   5
economy-wide  perspective  and  are  very  useful  when  the  numerous,  and 
often  intricate,  interactions  among  various  parts  of  an  economy  are  of 
critical importance. As for agriculture, such interactions can occur within 
the  sector  (as  in  competing  for  limited  productive  resources,  including 
various  types  of  land)  and  also  between  agriculture  and  other  sectors 
that service it or that operate in the food and fiber chain. Such sectors 
and actors include downstream processors, traders and distributors, final 
consumers, and governments (in the form of public policies). 
A  strength  of  CGE  models  is  their  ability  to  analyze  the  interactions 
among  different  sectors—for  example,  agriculture,  manufacturing,  and 
services  operating  through  commodity  and  factor  markets.  They  also 
explicitly incorporate taxes and subsidies that can have distorting effects on 
incentives and the operation of markets. In their conventional usage, CGE 
models are flexible price models used to examine the impact of relative 
price changes on allocations of goods and factors across a range of economic 
agents. Thus, in addition to providing insights into the economy-wide general 
equilibrium effects of policy changes, CGE models allow examination of key 
inter-industry linkages. 
However, global CGE models are poor in addressing distributional issues 
within  regions;  only  average  adjustments  are  simulated.  Moreover,  CGE 
models should be handled with care for long-term projections, since funda-
mental changes in the economic structure of a region cannot be simulated 
easily by a CGE model. 
Because CGE models provide a representation of the whole economy, 
not just one sector, they require us to develop an explicit (if simplified) 
representation  of  all  factors  of  production.  Technology  is  often  repre-
sented with cost functions (for example, CES functions), which may not 
provide an adequate description of agricultural crop technologies. While 
CGE work is currently underway on nested functions, flexible functional 
forms, and other enhancements, the models still operate in the tradition 
of smooth, neoclassical production functions. other limitations of most 
current CGE models are the use of the restrictive Armington functions to 
represent international trade, and a relatively aggregate modeling of all 
sectors, especially agriculture. 
Ultimately, for the set of issues addressed in this report, PE models offer 
an advantage in the detailed specification of commodities and the deeper 
structural  representation  of  production  technologies  (including  the  use  of 
crop models rather than production or cost functions). This representation 
supports links to land-use models, water models, and climate change and/or 
weather models. CGE models are too aggregated to provide a framework for 
such a deep structural representation of the operation of agriculture. 6   CHAPTER 1
IFPRI’s IMPACT Modeling Suite
Figure 1.1 provides a diagram of the links among the three models used: 
IFPRI’s  IMPACT  model  (Rosegrant  et  al.  2008),  a  partial  equilibrium 
agriculture  model  that  emphasizes  policy  simulations;  a  hydrology  model 
incorporated  into  IMPACT;  and  the  DSSAT  crop  model  suite  (Jones  et  al. 
2003) that estimates yields of crops under varying management systems and 
climate change scenarios. The modeling methodology reconciles the limited 
spatial  resolution  of  macro-level  economic  models  that  operate  through 
equilibrium-driven relationships at a national level with detailed models of 
biophysical processes at high spatial resolution. The DSSAT system is used to 
simulate responses of five important crops (rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, 
and groundnuts) to climate, soil, and nutrient availability, at current loca-
tions based on the SPAM dataset of crop location and management techniques 
Figure 1.1  The IMPACT 2009 modeling framework
Source:  Authors.
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(You and Wood 2006). This analysis is done at a spatial resolution of 15 arc 
minutes, or about 30 km at the equator. These results are aggregated up to 
the IMPACT model’s 281 spatial units, called food production units (FPUs) 
(see Figure 1.2). The FPUs are defined by political boundaries and major river 
basins. (See Appendix 3 for more details.) 
Income and Population Drivers
IFPRI’s IMPACT model has a wide variety of options for exploring plausible 
scenarios. The drivers used for simulations include: population, GDP, climate 
scenarios,  rainfed  and  irrigated  exogenous  productivity  and  area  growth 
rates (by crop), and irrigation efficiency. In all cases except climate, the 
country-specific  (or  more  disaggregated)  values  can  be  adjusted  individu-
ally. Differences in GDP and population growth define the overall scenarios 
analyzed here, with all other driver values remaining the same across the 
three scenarios. 
Table 1.1 documents the GDP and population growth choices for the three 
overall scenarios.
Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show the regional GDP and population growth 
rates respectively. GDP growth rates are highest in Eastern and Central Africa 
(albeit from very low bases), as well as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East 
Figure 1.2  The 281 FPUs in the IMPACT model
Source: Authors.8   CHAPTER 1
Asia.  The  lowest  GDP  growth  rates  are  in  Europe  and  oceania.  Population 
growth rates are highest in Africa and lowest in Europe. For the optimistic 
scenario, population growth rates are negative in much of Europe, Central Asia, 
and oceania, but still more than 1.5 percent per year in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The  GDP  and  population  growth  rates  combine  to  generate  the  three 
scenarios  of  per  capita  GDP  growth.  The  results  by  regions  are  shown  in   
Table 1.1  GDP and population choices for the three overall scenarios
Category Pessimistic  Baseline Optimistic
GDP, constant 
2000 US$
Lowest of the four GDP 
growth rate scenarios from 
the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment GDP scenarios 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assess-
ment 2005) and the rate used 
in the baseline (next column)
Based on rates from 
World Bank EACC 
study (Margulis et al. 
2010), updated for 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asian 
countries
Highest of the four GDP 
growth rates from the 
Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment GDP scenar-
ios and the rate used in 
the baseline (previous 
column)
Population UN high variant, 2008 revision UN medium variant, 
2008 revision
UN low variant, 2008 
revision
Source:  Compiled by authors.
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Table 1.2. (See Appendix 1 for the list of countries in each of the income 
groups  and  the  regional  groups  displayed  in  Figures  1.3  and  1.4.)  The 
baseline growth rates are somewhat below those for 1990–2000, except for 
the  middle-income  developing  countries.  The  optimistic  growth  rates  are 
substantially higher than 1990–2000, except for developed countries.




Developed 2.7 0.74 2.17 2.56
Developing 3.9 2.09 3.86 5.00
Low-income developing 4.7 2.60 3.60 4.94
Middle-income developing 3.8 2.21 4.01 5.11
World 2.9 0.86 2.49 3.22
Source:  World Development Indicators for 1990–2000 and authors’ calculations for 2010–2050.
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Table 1.3 shows population and GDP per capita in 2050 for the three 
scenarios. The baseline scenario has just over 9 billion people in 2050; the 
optimistic scenario results in a substantially smaller number, 7.9 billion; the 
pessimistic scenario results in 10.4 billion people. For developed countries, 
the differences among the three scenarios are relatively small, with little 
overall population growth: population ranges from just over 1 billion to 1.3 
billion in 2050, compared to 1 billion in 2010. For the developing countries 
as a group, the total 2010 population of 5.8 billion becomes 6.9 billion to 9 
billion in 2050, depending on scenario.
Average world per capita income, beginning at $6,6001 in 2010, ranges 
from $8,800 to $23,800 in 2050, depending on scenario. The gap between 
average per capita income in developed and developing countries is large in 
2010: developing countries’ income level is only 5.6 percent of the developed 
countries’ level. Regardless of scenario, the relative difference is reduced 
over time: the developing country income increases to between 8.6 percent 
and 14.0 percent of developed country income in 2050, depending on overall 
scenario.  Middle-  and  low-income  developing  countries’  2010  per  capita 
income values are 6.5 percent and 2.6 percent respectively of the developed 
country income. By 2050, the share increases to between 10.4 percent and 
1 All references to dollars are for constant 2000 US dollars.





World  7,913   9,096   10,399 
Developed  1,022   1,035   1,169   1,315 
Developing  5,848   6,877   7,927   9,083 
 Middle-income developing  4,869   5,283   6,103   7,009 
 Low-income developing 980  1,594   1,825  2,074 
Income per capita (2000 US$)
World  6,629   23,760   17,723   8,779 
Developed  33,700   93,975   79,427   43,531 
Developing  1,897   13,190   8,624   3,747 
 Middle-income developing  2,194   15,821   10,577   4,531 
 Low-income developing 420  4,474  2,094   1,101 
Note:  2010 income per capita is for the baseline scenario.INTRoDUCTIoN   11
16.8 percent for middle-income developing countries, depending on overall 
scenario. For the low-income developing countries, however, the 2050 ratios 
remain low—between 2.5 percent and 4.8 percent.
Climate Change Drivers
Introducing the effects of climate change scenarios into the overall food and 
agriculture scenarios presents a particular challenge, to take into account the 
range of plausible pathways for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Moreover, 
the general circulation models (GCMs) translate those emission scenarios into 
varying temperature and precipitation outcomes. While the general conse-
quences of increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are increasingly 
well known, great uncertainty remains about how climate change effects will 
play out in specific locations.2 Figure 1.5 shows the range of average surface 
temperature outcomes for the GHG pathways in the SRES scenarios of the 
IPCC. By 2050, the global surface warming for the A1B, A2, and B1 scenarios 
is roughly the same, at about 1°C above the reference period of the late 20th 
century. The temperature increases diverge significantly after 2050, with the 
A2 scenario resulting in the highest increases by the end of the 20th century, 
of about 3.5 °C. Because the analysis in this report stops in 2050, it does not 
capture the effects of the large increases expected in later years.
Figure 1.6 shows the fossil fuel Co2 emissions associated with the various 
IPCC SRES scenarios, as well as actual emissions through 2009 (dotted line). 
Note that from 2005 to 2009, the actual emissions path was above those of all 
the illustrative marker scenarios (the solid lines) except A1B, although it was 
within the range of the scenario envelope. The global economic downturn 
that began in late 2008 significantly reduced fossil fuel emissions. If emissions 
2 To understand the significant uncertainty in how these effects play out over the surface of the 
earth, it is useful to describe briefly the process by which the results depicted in Figure 1.7 and 
Figure 1.8 are derived. They start with GCMs that model the physics and chemistry of the atmo-
sphere and its interactions with oceans and the land surface. Several GCMs have been developed 
around the world. Next, integrated assessment models (IAMs) simulate the interactions between 
humans and their surroundings, including industrial activities, transportation, and agriculture and 
other land uses; these models estimate the emissions of the various greenhouse gases (most im-
portantly, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide). Several independent IAMs exist as well. 
The emissions simulation results of the IAMs are made available to the GCM models as inputs that 
alter atmospheric chemistry. The end result is a set of estimates of precipitation and tempera-
ture values around the globe, often at two-degree intervals (about 200 km at the equator) for 
most models. Periodically, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issues assess-
ment reports on the state of our understanding of climate science and interactions with the 
oceans, land, and human activities. For the 5th assessment, the approach followed is to devise 
representative concentration pathways (RCPs) of low, medium, and high GHG emissions, and then 
to develop the range of scenarios that are plausibly consistent with these emissions rates. See 
www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7282/fig_tab/nature08823_F5.html. Initial results suggest that a 
broad range of GDP and population growth rate combinations can result in the main RCPs.12   CHAPTER 1
continue to exceed the scenarios used here, then the climate effects by 2050 
would exceed the estimates presented here.
At this point there is no single emissions scenario that is viewed as most 
likely. Furthermore, the climate outputs from different GCMs using identical 
GHG emissions scenarios differ substantially, with no obvious way to choose 
among  them.  The  climate  data  with  sufficient  detail  available  for  this 
analysis are from four GCMs, each with three SRES scenarios—A1B, A2, and 
B1 (see Appendix 3 for details).
Agricultural productivity is strongly determined by both temperature and 
precipitation.  Lobell  and  Burke  (2008)  find  that  “uncertainties  related  to 
temperature represented a greater contribution to climate change impact 
uncertainty than those related to precipitation for most crops and regions, 
and in particular the sensitivity of crop yields to temperature was a critical 
source of uncertainty.” 
Table 1.4 shows global summary statistics for selected GCMS and SRES 
scenarios  that  make  available  average  monthly  minimum  and  maximum 
temperature,  sorted  from  lowest  to  highest  precipitation  change.  It  also 
includes the mean temperature and precipitation change for the complete 
ensemble of GCMs reported by the 4th IPCC assessment. (See Appendix 3, 
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Source:  Reprinted with permission from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007).INTRoDUCTIoN   13
Table A1.2 for regional summary statistics for the A2 scenario; see www.
ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/suppl/chapter10/Ch10_indiv-
maps.html for maps showing the individual GCM results and the ensemble 
means.) A quick glance at Table 1.4 shows the expected general tendencies 
but also the large degree of uncertainty. First, as average temperatures rise, 
so does the annual precipitation that falls on land. A 1°C increase in average 
temperature typically results in less than a 1 percent increase in average 
annual precipitation. Temperature increases of over 2°C result in 2–5 percent 
increases in precipitation. Second, with identical GHG emissions, the GCM 
climate outputs differ substantially. The most extreme comparison is with 
the outcomes of the B1 scenario. The CSIRo GCM has almost no increase in 
average annual precipitation and the smallest temperature increase of any 
of  the  GCM/GHG  scenario  combinations.  The  MIRoC  GCM  has  the  second 
largest increase in precipitation (with the B1 scenario) and one of the largest 
increases in average temperature. 

























































Note:  “The graph shows that estimates of annual industrial Co2 emissions in gigatons of carbon 
per year (GtC yr−1) for 1990–2008 (black circles) and for 2009 (open circle) fall within the 
range of all 40 SRES scenarios (grey shaded area) and of the six SRES illustrative marker 
scenarios (colored lines). The inset in the upper left corner shows these scenarios to the 
year 2100.” 
    Adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Geoscience, “Misrepre-
sentation of the IPCC Co2 emission scenarios,” by M. R. Manning  et al., vol. 3, issue 6,   
pp. 376-377, Figure 1, copyright 2010.14   CHAPTER 1
For this analysis, we use four climate scenarios that span the range of 
the means of the GCM ensemble results and also have the requisite monthly 
average  minimum  and  maximum  temperature  data  needed  for  the  crop 
modeling  analysis.  The  CSIRo  A1B  and  B1  scenarios  represent  a  dry  and 
relatively cool future; the MIRoC A1B and B1 scenarios represent a wet and 
warmer future.
Biophysical Effects of Climate Change
The global averages from the GCMs conceal both substantial regional vari-
ability and changes in seasonal patterns. These nuances are captured in the 
DSSAT analysis, which uses the monthly data and high resolution spatial data 
on climate and other geophysical variables. Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 map 
the average annual changes in precipitation for the CSIRo and MIRoC A1B 
scenarios.  Note  that  although  the  MIRoC  scenario  results  in  substantially 
greater increases in average precipitation globally, there are certain regions, 
such as the northeast part of Brazil and the eastern half of the United States, 
where this scenario results in a much drier future.
The DSSAT analysis of the biophysical effects of climate change takes into 
account location-specific information on climate, soils, and nitrogen applica-
tion. The analysis reported here uses version 4.5 of DSSAT, with atmospheric 
concentration of Co2 in 2050 set at 369 ppm. This amount is substantially 
less than the level predicted by most of the GHG scenarios. However, for this 
analysis, the only use of Co2 concentrations is as part of the crop modeling, 
and the model response to Co2 is likely to be overstated.3 Hence, we use the 
lower concentration amount as more representative of likely outcomes in 
farmers’ fields.
3 Plants produce more vegetative matter as atmospheric concentrations of Co2 increase. The 
effect depends on the nature of the photosynthetic process used by the plant species. So-called 
C3 plants use Co2 less efficiently than C4 plants, so C3 plants such as rice and wheat are more 
sensitive to higher concentrations of Co2 than C4 plants like maize and sugarcane. It remains 
an open question whether these laboratory results translate to actual field conditions. A recent 
report on experiments on Co2 fertilization in experimental fields, the FACE experiments (Long et 
al. 2006), finds that the effects in the field are approximately 50 percent less than in  
experiments in enclosed containers. And another report (Zavala et al. 2008) finds that higher  
levels of atmospheric Co2 increase soybean plants’ susceptibility to the Japanese beetle and 
maize susceptibility to the western corn rootworm. Finally, a 2010 study (Bloom et al. 2010) 
finds that higher Co2 concentrations inhibit the assimilation of nitrate into organic nitrogen 
compounds. (See Ainsworth et al. 2008 for comparison of the chamber and FACE experiment 
results.) Even the FACE experiments are done in experimental settings. However, when nitrogen 
is limiting, the Co2 fertilization effect is dramatically reduced. So the actual benefits in farmer 
fields of Co2 fertilization remain uncertain. Furthermore, we do not model the effects of ozone 
damage or increased competition from pests and diseases that seem likely in a world with higher  
temperatures and more precipitation. So we justify our use of the 369 ppm modeling as an 
imperfect mechanism to capture these effects.INTRoDUCTIoN   15
Table 1.4  GCM and SRES scenario global average changes, 2000–2050
GCM SRES 
scenario











CSIRO B1 0.0  0.1  1.2  1.0 
CSIRO A1B 0.7  4.8  1.6  1.4 
CSIRo A2 0.9  6.5  1.9  1.8 
ECH B1 1.6  11.6  2.1  1.9 
CNR B1 1.9  14.0  1.9  1.7 
ECH A2 2.1  15.0  2.4  2.2 
CNR A2 2.7  19.5  2.5  2.2 
ECH A1B 3.2  23.4  2.7  2.5 
MIRoC A2 3.2  23.4  2.8  2.6 
CNR A1B 3.3  23.8  2.6  2.3 
MIROC B1 3.6  25.7  2.4  2.3 





Source:  Authors’ calculations. Multi-model ensemble means come from IPCC et al. 2007: mean 
temperature increase, Table 10.5, and mean precipitation increase, Table S10.2. See 
Appendix 3 for details on the GCMs and scenarios.
Note:  In this table and elsewhere in the text, a reference to a particular year for a climate 
realization such as 2000, 2050 is in fact referring to mean values around that year. 
For example, the data described as 2000 in this table are representative of the period 
1950–2000. The data described as 2050 are representative of the period 2041–2060. GCM 
scenario combinations in bold are the ones used in the climate scenario analysis.
Table  1.5  provides  a  summary  assessment  of  the  biophysical  effects 
of climate change on yields. Each crop is “grown” first with 2000 climate 
and then with 2050 climate, with identical location-specific inputs. For the 
results in this table, irrigated crops are assumed to receive as much water 
as needed so irrigated crop yield effects are driven by temperature only. 
Yield effects for rainfed crops combine both temperature and precipitation 
effects.  Figures  1.9–1.14  show  graphically  the  effects  of  the  A1B  climate 
scenario with the CSIRo and MIRoC GCMs on rainfed maize and wheat and 
irrigated  rice.  Yellows  and  reds  indicate  reduced  precipitation;  light  and 
dark blues show increased precipitation. Because the MIRoC A1B scenario 16   CHAPTER 1












Source:  Authors’ calculations based on downscaled climate data, available at http://futureclim.info.









Source:  Authors’ calculations based on downscaled climate data, available at http://futureclim.info.INTRoDUCTIoN   17
has the greatest increase in precipitation, it tends to have higher rainfed 
yields than the CSIRo A1B scenario in the tropical regions. But it also has 
higher temperatures, which tend to reduce rainfed yields of wheat in the 
tropical regions and irrigated yields generally. As can be seen in Figure 1.10, 
the eastern part of the United States sees a large decline in precipitation in 
the MIRoC A1B scenario. The average rainfed maize yield there is 33 percent 
lower with 2050 climate than with 2000 climate.4
4 Easterling et al. 2007 present figures from a meta-analysis of the sensitivity of cereal yield 
against mean local temperature change for maize, wheat and rice, as derived from the results of 
69 published studies from 1993 to 2006 at multiple simulation sites. They caution: “The results of 
such simulations are generally highly uncertain due to many factors, including large discrepancies 
in GCM predictions of regional precipitation change, poor representation of impacts of extreme 
events and the assumed strength of Co2 fertilisation.” They conclude: “Nevertheless, these 
summaries indicate that in mid- to high-latitude regions, moderate to medium local increases in 
temperature (1°C to 3°C), across a range of Co2 concentrations and rainfall changes, can have 
small beneficial impacts on the main cereal crops.” None of these reports were able to use the 
results of the 4th Assessment climate models, which had not been released at the time of the 
Easterling publication. our research is based on these newer climate modeling results, limited to 
two of the sets of GCM results available.
Table 1.5    Biophysical effects of climate change on yields (percent change 2000 
climate to 2050 climate)
Category/model
Maize Rice Wheat
Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed
Developed
CSIRo -5.71 -4.42 -5.33 -13.11 -5.45 -3.89
MIRoC -12.31 -29.86 -13.26 -12.81 -11.58 -9.04
Developing
CSIRo -3.86 -0.84 -9.76 -1.05 -10.20 -4.15
MIRoC -5.25 -3.47 -11.91 0.11 -13.35 -10.39
Low-income developing
CSIRo -3.07 -3.12 -9.79 -0.58 -10.09 -11.79
MIRoC -3.37 -0.51 -9.05 1.61 -12.56 -18.00
Middle-income developing
CSIRo -3.90 -0.36 -9.79 -1.30 -10.21 -3.74
MIRoC -5.34 -4.05 -12.49 -0.67 -13.40 -9.98
World
CSIRo -4.23 -1.98 -9.52 -1.05 -9.90 -4.05
MIRoC -7.24 -12.01 -12.08 0.07 -13.24 -9.88
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  The results are for the A1B scenario with assumed Co2 atmospheric concentration of 369 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Assessing the Scenario and Simulation Outcomes
T
he  climate-change-driven  productivity  effects  are  incorporated 
into the hydrology and economic elements of the IMPACT model to 
assess the combined effects of economic, population, and climate 
scenarios.  The  process  of  modeling  agricultural  futures  proceeds  roughly 
as follows. Supply is determined at the food production unit (FPU) level by 
farmer responses to prices, conditioned by assumptions about exogenously 
determined area (AGRs) and yield growth rates (IPRs) as well as assumptions 
regarding climate productivity effects on irrigated and rainfed crops. Demand 
is  determined  at  the  national  level  by  consumer  responses  to  changes  in 
national income and prices. When supply is greater than demand, exports 
occur. For the world, net trade in a commodity must be zero. World prices 
are adjusted to ensure this outcome for a year. This process is repeated for 
each year through to 2050. 
We focus on three indicators of the outcomes: the prices of the most 
important  crops  (maize,  rice,  and  wheat);  the  average  daily  kilocalories 
(kcal) consumed; and the number of malnourished children under five. (More 
details on the methodology are provided in Appendix 3.)
Simulations, performed using the baseline overall scenario, are chosen to 
explore possible intervention options in productivity, including an increase 
for all crops in all countries and an increase for commercial maize, wheat, 
and cassava in selected countries. In addition, we examine the outcome of 
an extreme drought in South Asia.
Price Outcomes
World prices are a useful single indicator of the future of agriculture. Rising 
prices signal the existence of imbalances in supply and demand and growing 
resource scarcity, driven by demand factors such as growing population and 
income  or  by  supply  factors  such  as  reduced  productivity  due  to  climate 
change.  Table  2.1  reports  price  scenarios  from  the  Millennium  Ecosystem 
Assessment,  and  Table  2.2  summarizes  the  overall  scenario  outcomes  for ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   21
rice, wheat, and maize prices and the various simulations. Figures 2.2–2.5 
show 2010 and 2050 prices by commodity from the overall scenarios. 
A  first  key  observation  is  that,  unlike  in  the  20th  century  when  real 
agricultural prices declined (see Figure 2.1), the price scenarios in this report 
show substantial increases between 2010 and 2050. The price increases vary 
from 31.2 percent for rice in the optimistic scenario to 100.7 percent for 
maize in the pessimistic scenario (see Table 2.2). The pessimistic scenario has 
the highest price increases, as high population and low income growth rates 
combine to increase the demand for staple foods. 
These price increases incorporate the effect of climate change. Relative to 
a world with perfect mitigation, prices in 2050 with climate change are 18.4 
percent (optimistic for rice) to 34.1 percent (pessimistic for maize) higher.
It is of interest to compare these results to other scenario exercises. only 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) scenarios extend to 2050 in the 
detail needed to compare with the results in this study. In the MA scenarios, 
2050  prices  range  from  68  percent  of  the  1997  price  (rice  in  the  Global 
orchestration scenario) to 156 percent (rice in the Adapting Mosaic scenario). 
Generally,  the  Technogarden  scenario—with  its  lower  population  growth 
and  higher  income  growth—results  in  price  declines;  while  the  Adapting 
Mosaic and order from Strength scenarios—which combine low income and 
high population growth—have the largest price increases. The MA scenarios 
did  not  incorporate  the  effects  of  climate  change  on  productivity,  so  its 
price increases can be expected to be less than the results in this study. 
Table 2.1    International prices of maize, rice, and wheat, 1997 and MA 2050 
scenario prices (US$/mt and percent of 2050)
Scenario Maize Rice Wheat

























Source:  Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, Figure 9.30.
Note:  Values in parentheses are the 2050 scenario price as a percent of the 1997 value.22   CHAPTER 2
In mid-2010, oECD and FAo released their outlook of prices to 2020. They 
report that “Average wheat and coarse grain prices [in 2020] are projected 
to be nearly 15–40% higher in real terms relative to 1997–2006” (oECD 2010). 
Hertel, Burke, and Lobell (2010) suggest that “prices for major staples rise 
10–60% by 2030.”
Although the price results suggest a significant change from the 20th 
century,  the  price  increases  are  smaller  than  the  scenario  per  capita 
income increases, which range from a low of 29 percent for developed 
countries  in  the  pessimistic  scenario  to  a  high  of  over  600  percent  for 
low-income  countries  in  the  optimistic  scenario.  This  difference  results 
in  increased  average  calorie  consumption  and  lower  child  malnutrition, 
discussed below.
To trace out the causes of these price increases, we examine the links 
from yield and area changes to production, international trade flows, and 
consumption.
Figure 2.1    Prices of selected U.S. farm commodities, 1904–2006  

























Source:  Indices constructed from “Prices received by farmers,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
National Agricultural Statistics Service. Agricultural Statistics.  Various issues. And de-
flated by the GDP deflator, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  Table  1.1.9  Implicit  Price  Deflators  for  Gross 
Domestic Product, various years.ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   23
Table 2.2.  Price outcomes of the overall scenarios and the simulations
Scenarios Maize  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Rice  Wheat 
% price change, 2010 mean to  
2050 mean  
 (2050 std. dev. and CoV6)
% price change, 2050 

























% price change, 2010 mean to  
2050 mean
% price change, 2050 
perfect mitigation to 
2050 mean CC
Productivity improvement simulations
overall to Irrigation 59.8 31.2 20.0 36.2 20.0 22.2
Commercial maize  11.9 53.8 50.0 33.9 19.8 22.8
Developing country 
wheat 
97.9 54.4 28.2 32.1 19.8 22.5
Developing country 
cassava 
97.5 54.5 53.0 32.0 19.8 22.9
Irrigation 101.5 50.1 52.5 34.3 19.5 22.7
Simulation of drought in 
South Asia 2030–2035
93.7 55.0 51.9 31.8 19.8 22.9
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  The percentage increase for the scenarios is the mean across the results for the four cli-
mate scenarios, CSIRo and MIRoC GCMs with the SRES A1B and B1 GHG forcings. For the 
overall scenarios, the numbers in parentheses and italics are the standard deviation (std. 
dev.) and coefficient of variation (CoV) of the 2050 price for the four climate scenarios. 
The perfect mitigation results assume all GHG emissions cease in 2000 and the climate 
momentum in the system is halted.
Yield Outcomes
It is useful to describe how IMPACT deals with productivity increases that 
are outside of the direct modeling environment. Sources of changes include: 
investments in agricultural productivity by the public and private sectors; 
technology  dissemination  by  research  and  extension  agencies  and  input 
suppliers; and investments in infrastructure, such as rural roads. For each 
6 The standard deviation shows how much variation a variable has from its mean value. A larger 
value means that the range of the variable—prices in this case—is also large. It is a useful sum-
mary value for variability in a single variable but cannot be used to compare variability of differ-
ent variables. The coefficient of variation (CoV) is the standard deviation divided by the mean. It 
makes possible comparisons of the variability of different variables (for example, prices and the 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.26   CHAPTER 2
crop in each FPU, and for both irrigated and rainfed management systems, 
IMPACT  requires  an  assumption  about  exogenous  yield  growth  (that  is, 
the  intrinsic  productivity  growth  rates,  or  IPRs)  in  five-year  increments.   
Figure  2.6  illustrates  the  concept  with  the  IPRs  for  irrigated  and  rainfed 
rice  in  the  California  FPU  of  the  United  States.  The  IPRs  were  originally 
constructed based on empirical analysis of the determinants of yield growth 
in  the  1990s  (Evenson  and  Rosegrant  1995)  and  then  updated  as  better 
information became available. As a general rule, with many exceptions, the 
IPRs tend to increase slightly over the next 10–15 years and then decline 
gradually (to 2050). This pattern is based on historical trends in research 
expenditures, as well as on expert opinion on how research expenditures are 
likely to continue and the effects on crop productivity. The exogenous IPRs 
are then adjusted to account for the effects of climate change and producer 
responses to changes in prices.
Table  2.3  reports  the  combined  effects  of  the  IPRs,  climate  change, 
and the economic and demographic drivers on yields for the major crops in 
irrigated and rainfed systems. The table shows both absolute yields and the 
Figure 2.6    Rice intrinsic productivity growth rates (IPRs) for the California FPU 
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.ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   31
average annual growth rates. For irrigated crops, the growth rates range from 
a low of about 0.2 percent per year (0.22 percent for maize in developed 
countries, with climate change and the optimistic scenario) to a high of over 
1.5 percent per year (1.53 percent for irrigated soy in developed countries, 
with  perfect  mitigation  and  the  baseline  scenario).  Yields  in  low-income 
developing countries are generally lower than in middle-income developing 
or developed countries, both in 2010 and 2050. For some crops (cassava, 
potato, sorghum, and wheat), both rainfed and irrigated yields grow faster in 
the low-income developing countries than in the middle-income developing 
countries; for the important irrigated crops, however, low-income developing 
country growth rates remain low.
For rainfed systems, yields and yield growth rates are somewhat lower 
than  for  irrigated  systems.  Yield  growth  rates  range  from  a  low  of  0.25 
percent per annum (developed country maize with climate change and the 
optimistic scenario) to a high of 1.88 percent per annum (wheat in low-income 
developing countries with perfect mitigation and the pessimistic scenario).
Area Outcomes
Agricultural area change in the IMPACT model has both an exogenous (AGR) 
and endogenous (price-responsive) component.75 The exogenous component 
reflects  a  combination  of  historical  trends  and  assessments  about  future 
changes, including urbanization and other land use change. The AGR values 
typically decline throughout the period; they are greater than zero for crops 
in some countries and less than zero for others. Figures 2.7–2.10 are graphs 
of irrigated rice AGRs in India and China and rainfed maize AGRs in the United 
States and Brazil. In all cases they decline, but the Indian, Brazilian, and U.S. 
AGRs are for the most part greater than zero in the early part of the period, 
while the Chinese APRs are negative from the beginning.
As Table 2.4 shows, the net effect of the scenarios on global land use 
change is relatively small. Depending on scenario, the area change ranges 
from an increase of 2.3 percent (31.9 million hectares (ha) Perfect Mitigation, 
baseline) to a decline of 2.2 percent (30.9 million ha, CSIRo B1, optimistic). 
Global averages, however, conceal substantial differences around the world. 
Developed countries show a decline in agricultural area of 9 percent to 13 
percent. For middle-income developing countries, crop area shows small net 
changes. For low-income developing countries, crop area expands dramati-
cally, from 18 percent to 25 percent.
7 In IMPACT, agricultural area change is the equivalent of FAo’s crop area harvested. It includes 
double- and triple-cropped area where it exists. As with other agricultural statistics, IMPACT 
relies heavily on FAoSTAT. For agricultural area, there can be substantial difference between 
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CSIRo A1B  240  -26.7 -32.0 -27.1
CSIRo B1  239  -27.5 -32.2 -27.9
MIRoC A1B  242  -21.0 -25.7 -21.3
MIRoC B1  241  -23.5 -26.6 -22.4
Perfect mitigation  241  -23.5 -28.0 -23.9
Low-income developing
CSIRo A1B  181  38.1 32.5 41.2
CSIRo B1  181  38.6 33.6 41.8
MIRoC A1B  181  37.4 32.5 40.6
MIRoC B1  181  37.2 32.5 40.6
Perfect mitigation  182  43.2 38.1 46.3
Middle-income developing
CSIRo A1B  956  -11.7 -30.1 -8.1
CSIRo B1  955  -15.6 -32.3 -12.2
MIRoC A1B  960  0.2 -16.4 2.7
MIRoC B1  956  -9.8 -22.5 -2.7
Perfect mitigation  963  12.2 -4.4 15.6
World
CSIRo A1B  1,376  -0.4 -29.6 6.0
CSIRo B1  1,375  -4.6 -30.9 1.6
MIRoC A1B  1,382  16.7 -9.7 22.0
MIRoC B1  1,378  3.9 -16.6 15.5
Perfect mitigation  1,386  31.9 5.8 38.0
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  2010 results are for baseline scenario.
Figure  2.11  and  Figure  2.12  illustrate  more  dramatically  the  variation 
in crop area outcomes by country. Figure 2.11 graphs the area declines for 
all countries that lose more than 1 million hectares (ha) with the baseline 
overall scenario. Prominent among these are the middle-income developing 
countries China and India, each with 15–20 million ha of crop area decline. 
This represents about 10 percent of Chinese 2010 crop area and 9 percent of 
Indian 2010 crop area.
Figure 2.12 graphs the area increases for all countries where crop area 
expands by more than 1 million ha in the baseline overall scenario. While ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   35




























Source:  Authors’ estimates.






































Source:  Authors’ estimates.36   CHAPTER 2
Table 2.5  Scenario results for maize, rice, and wheat production
























Perfect mitigation  368.8 520.5 41.1 374.9 525.0 40.0 375.6 512.5 36.4
Climate change 
mean
357.1 442.4 23.9 364.1 454.8 24.9 363.9 437.4 20.2
Developing
Perfect mitigation 393.5 607.4 54.4 399.1 612.1 53.4 399.8 599.4 49.9
Climate change 
mean
396.5 628.8 58.6 401.8 629.7 56.7 402.9 620.1 53.9
Low-income developing
Perfect mitigation 30.8 45.6 48.2 31.2 46.0 47.2 31.3 45.0 43.7
Climate change 
mean
31.0 46.5 50.1 31.4 46.7 48.7 31.5 45.8 45.3
Middle-income developing
Perfect mitigation 362.7 561.8 54.9 367.9 566.1 53.9 368.5 554.4 50.5
Climate change 
mean
365.5 582.3 59.3 370.4 583.0 57.4 371.4 574.3 54.6
the number of countries with area declines is relatively small, there are many 
countries included in this figure, with Brazil and Nigeria having the greatest 
increases. And these countries are overwhelmingly located in the developing 
world. 
Interestingly, the effects of climate change are not consistent. In some 
countries, area changes are greater with climate change: China, for example, 
has greater area loss under climate change than under perfect mitigation. In 
other countries, climate change brings smaller area changes: in Uganda and 
Brazil, area expansion is much less with climate change.
Production Outcomes
The yield and area changes combine to give production changes as reported 
in Table 2.5, showing maize, rice, and wheat for the overall scenarios, both 
with perfect mitigation and with mean climate change outcomes. of these 
three  crops,  maize  sees  the  largest  increase  in  production  between  2010 
and 2050 under most scenarios. For developed and developing countries, the 
increase for maize is in the range of 20 percent to 59 percent over the period. ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   37
























Perfect mitigation 18.8 20.7 9.9 18.8 19.9 5.6 18.9 19.1 1.2
Climate change 
mean
18.1 18.2 0.6 18.1 17.6 -3.2 18.1 16.8 -7.6
Developing
Perfect mitigation 388.0 453.4 16.8 388.4 433.4 11.6 388.7 418.1 7.6
Climate change 
mean
382.1 418.1 9.4 382.3 398.1 4.1 382.8 385.6 0.7
Low-income developing
Perfect mitigation 81.5 108.2 32.8 81.6 103.5 26.8 81.7 98.6 20.7
Climate change 
mean
81.0 104.8 29.3 81.1 100.2 23.5 81.2 95.1 17.1
Middle-income developing
Perfect mitigation 306.5 345.1 12.6 306.8 329.9 7.5 307.0 319.5 4.1
Climate change 
mean
301.0 313.3 4.1 301.1 297.9 -1.1 301.7 290.5 -3.7
Wheat
Developed
Perfect mitigation 210.4 260.0 23.6 213.2 261.3 22.6 213.5 254.7 19.3
Climate change 
mean
206.6 238.7 15.5 209.7 243.2 16.0 209.7 233.6 11.4
Developing
Perfect mitigation 418.6 645.7 54.3 423.3 647.4 53.0 423.9 634.7 49.7
Climate change 
mean
412.1 597.9 45.1 416.4 598.8 43.8 417.2 587.4 40.8
Low-income developing
Perfect mitigation 19.2 37.4 94.5 19.5 37.6 93.1 19.5 36.7 88.0
Climate change 
mean
19.6 34.9 78.3 19.6 34.4 75.8 19.6 33.7 71.6
Middle-income developing
Perfect mitigation 399.4 608.4 52.3 403.8 609.8 51.0 404.4 598.1 47.9
Climate change 
mean
392.6 563.0 43.4 396.9 564.4 42.2 397.6 553.8 39.3
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table 2.5—Continued.38   CHAPTER 2
Figure 2.13  Engel curve (China)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
For rice, on the other hand, production increases are often in the single digits 
and in some cases negative (for developed and middle-income developing 
countries under the baseline and optimistic scenarios).
Rice production growth is largest in the low-income developing countries 
(17–33 percent). Wheat production growth is relatively small in developed 
countries (11–24 percent) but much larger in the developing countries (41–94 
percent).  Climate  change  reduces  maize  production  growth  in  developed 
countries (particularly in the United States with the MIRoC GCM), but gener-
ates  small  production  increases  in  the  developing  countries.  For  rice  and 
wheat,  climate  change  reduces  production  growth everywhere  relative  to 
perfect mitigation.
International Trade Outcomes
International trade flows provide a balancing mechanism for world agricultural 
markets. Countries with a comparative advantage in a crop can produce it rela-
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whose  comparative  advantage  lies  elsewhere.  But  comparative  advantage 
is not fixed. Climate change alters comparative advantage, as do changing 
consumer  preferences.  Economic  development  itself  changes  the  mix  of 
goods demanded by consumers. For example, with post-WWII income growth, 
Japanese consumers reduced rice consumption and increased consumption of 
higher value foodstuffs, including fruits, vegetables, meat, and fish. Chinese 
consumers today are following a similar pattern of reducing rice consump-
tion. Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.14 plot the relationship between consumption 
of selected commodities (in kilocalories per day) and per capita income in 
China and Japan, over the period 2000 to 2050 for the baseline scenario. Rice 
consumption in China declines from 887 kcal per day to 647 kcal per day, as per 
capita income rises from $780 to $12,400. Rice consumption in Japan declines 
from 635 kcal per day to 521 kcal per day, as per capita income rises from $45, 
500 to $112,900. This pattern has been repeated for other staples in other 
countries throughout the world as incomes have risen. our scenarios assume 
this pattern will continue for other countries, as their incomes rise. 
Figure 2.14  Engel curve (Japan)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Agricultural trade flows depend on the interaction between comparative 
advantage in agriculture (as determined by climate and resource endowments) 
and a wide-ranging set of local, regional, national, and international trade 
policies. Unfettered international trade allows comparative advantage to be 
more fully exploited. Restrictions on trade risk worsening the effects of climate 
change by reducing the ability of producers and consumers to adjust. It is 
important to point out that if climate change reduces productivity of certain 
crops in some regions and does not increase productivity adequately in other 
regions, trade cannot fully compensate for the global reduction in productivity. 
Early studies (Tobey, Reilly, and Kane 1992 and Reilly, Hohmann, and 
Kane 1994) concluded that agricultural impacts of climate change would in 
some cases be positive, and in other cases would be manageable globally 
in part because negative yield effects in temperate grain-producing regions 
would be buffered by interregional adjustments in production and consump-
tion and corresponding trade flows.
A widely cited 2004 publication based its conclusions on more complex 
modeling of both climate and agriculture, using the IPCC’s third assessment 
results. This report was still relatively sanguine about global food production, 
but with more caveats than the earlier papers: “The combined model and 
scenario experiments demonstrate that the world, for the most part, appears 
to be able to continue to feed itself under the SRES scenarios during the rest 
of this century. The explanation for this is that production in the developed 
countries generally benefits from climate change, compensating for declines 
projected for developing nations.” (Parry et al. 2004, p. 66.)86 
The results reported here confirm these earlier findings that trade flows 
are a potentially important climate change adjustment mechanism. Table 2.6 
shows trade scenarios for exports of maize, rice, and wheat.
The developed countries have dominated maize exports through the early 
21st century, but the average of the climate change results is a substantial 
decline in net maize exports, principally because of the negative effects of 
the  MIRoC  scenarios  on  U.S.  maize  production.  Developed  country  wheat 
exports decline in all scenarios. Developed countries are small net importers 
of rice in 2010; in the pessimistic scenario, rice imports decline substantially, 
but with the baseline and optimistic scenarios, they show little change. 
8 The earlier literature that suggests increased agricultural exports from developed to developing 
countries is based on less sophisticated modeling of climate change impacts and use of very 
limited numbers of climate change results. It has only been since the 4th IPCC assessment 
modeling results, released in the mid-2000s, that more detailed modeling has been possible. As 
should be clear from the research reported in this report, it is possible to have climate scenarios 
such as those generated by the MIRoC GCM that have very negative effects in temperate regions.ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   41

















Perfect mitigation 36.7 120.5 37.5 127.1 37.2 105.8
Climate change mean 27.8 -25.4 27.7 -36.6 27.4 -56.9
Rice
Perfect mitigation -2.6 -20.5 -2.7 -61.8 -2.6 -13.7
Climate change mean -3.0 -12.0 -3.1 -40.5 -3.0 -3.8
Wheat
Perfect mitigation 44.6 -48.8 44.1 -37.2 44.5 -39.5
Climate change mean 42.7 -66.8 41.8 -61.8 42.2 -63.9
Middle-income developing
Maize
Perfect mitigation -33.8 81.5 -33.8 83.0 -34.1 62.2
Climate change mean -26.1 -59.4 -25.4 -80.6 -25.7 -98.0
Rice
Perfect mitigation -7.0 -65.7 -6.8 25.1 -7.0 -171.7
Climate change mean -7.5 8.2 -7.3 82.2 -7.4 -94.9
Wheat
Perfect mitigation -38.7 -111.4 -38.1 -87.0 -37.2 -148.4
Climate change mean -37.6 -121.5 -36.8 -104.2 -35.8 -161.7
Low-income developing
Maize
Perfect mitigation -2.9 571.1 0.6 571.1 -3.1 586.3
Climate change mean -1.7 506.0 0.5 506.0 -1.7 555.9
Rice
Perfect mitigation 9.6 -53.4 -0.1 -53.4 9.6 -128.5
Climate change mean 10.4 2.5 0.0 2.5 10.4 -68.5
Wheat
Perfect mitigation -5.9 363.5 0.4 363.5 -7.3 516.3
Climate change mean -5.1 337.8 0.3 337.8 -6.4 482.4
Source:  Authors’ calculations.42   CHAPTER 2
For middle-income developing countries, maize imports increase substan-
tially with perfect mitigation but decline with climate change. Many of these 
countries reduce their rice consumption as incomes rise.97 In the optimistic 
scenario, their rice imports fall; and with perfect mitigation, these countries 
become net rice exporters. In the pessimistic scenario, however, with low 
income  and  high  population  growth,  middle-income  country  rice  imports 
increase. Wheat imports for these countries decline across the board, but the 
magnitude of the change differs dramatically depending on overall scenario 
and  climate  change  effects.  For  example,  in  the  optimistic  scenario  and 
perfect mitigation, these countries become small net exporters; with climate 
change, they remain net importers. 
In 2010, low-income developing countries are net importers of maize and 
wheat but net exporters of rice. In 2050, these countries still have large net 
wheat and maize imports, while net exports of rice have become net imports. 
Different climate models result in dramatically different effects on trade 
flows, as Figure 2.15 illustrates. With perfect mitigation, net cereal exports 
from the developed countries are about the same level in 2010 and 2050, 
regardless of overall scenario. With the CSIRo scenarios, net cereal exports 
from the developed countries decline somewhat. With the MIRoC scenarios, 
however,  developed  countries’  cereal  trade  actually  becomes  negative, 
with substantial imports. This particular result is driven by a combination of 
increased maize production in developing countries and the negative effects 
of the MIRoC climate scenarios on U.S. maize (see Table 2.7). For perfect 
mitigation and the CSIRo scenarios, U.S. production increases by more than 
40  percent  from  2010  to  2050.  With  the  MIRoC  scenarios,  however,  the 
increases are only 22 percent (B1) and a minimal 3.7 percent (A1B).
The  consequence  of  the  MIRoC  A1B-induced  production  effects  is  a 
dramatic decline in U.S. exports, falling by almost 70 percent. For the perfect 
mitigation  and  CSIRo  scenarios,  in  contrast,  U.S.  exports  roughly  double. 
This result demonstrates dramatically both the uncertainty in the climate 
scenarios and the importance of international trade in reducing the nega-
tive effects of climate change on agricultural productivity, whatever (and 
wherever) they are.
9 A general phenomenon of per capita income growth, known as Bennett’s Law, is a decline in 
consumption of starchy staples and increase in consumption of meat, oils, and a more diverse 
diet generally. The IMPACT model captures this effect explicitly in its baseline runs. However, 
it does not adjust for the resulting changes in real income for producers of agricultural 
commodities in the various simulations performed for this report. our expectation is that these 
second-round effects will be relatively small.ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   43
It is of interest to compare these trade change results with those derived 
by Liefert et al. (2010) for Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Their report, 
released before the Russian wheat embargo of 2010, suggests that by 2019 
Russia could become the world’s top wheat exporter, and that the combined 
wheat exports of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan could more than double 
those of the United States. The article bases its 2019 exports results on two 
kinds of adjustments that are unlikely to continue. The first is a decline in 
meat consumption in these countries that would free up grain for export. 
Table 2.7    U.S. maize production, 2010 and 2050, baseline scenario (million mt)
Category 2010 2050 Change (percent)
CSIRo A1B  326.5   461.2  41.2 
CSIRo B1  327.5   471.5  44.0 
MIRoC A1B  303.6   315.0  3.70 
MIRoC B1  314.8   384.0  22.0 
Perfect mitigation  328.0   476.8  45.3 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.44   CHAPTER 2
The second is efficiency gains from conversion of old-style state farms to 
privately run corporations that invest substantially in productivity-enhancing 
technology. They also make the point that area expansion is possible but less 
likely, dependent on high prices and investment in infrastructure to move the 
grain from marginal areas to world markets. 
our scenarios show U.S. wheat exports in 2020 at 2.1 to 2.7 times Russian 
exports, depending on the climate scenario. By 2050, however, U.S. exports 
range from merely 0.8 to 1.1 times Russian exports. The more rapid growth of 
Russian exports is driven by productivity increases rather than area expansion.
Consumption and Human Well-Being Outcomes
This section focuses on maize, rice, and wheat, as the most important crops 
for calorie consumption globally. As Table 2.8 shows, rice and wheat each 
account for more than 500 kcal per day for the world’s average consumer. 
Together, rice and wheat make up more than one-third of consumption of the 
IMPACT commodities of 2,590 kcal per day; oils are the third largest IMPACT 
component, and sugar and directly consumed maize are fourth and fifth. For 
developing countries as a group, the rank order of commodities is identical. 
However,  for  the  low-income  developing  countries,  maize  is  second  most 
important and cassava fourth; the top five commodities account for over   
70 percent of their total consumption of 2,041 kcal per day.
Physical human well-being has many determinants. Calorie availability is 
a key element in low-income countries, where malnutrition and poverty are 
serious problems. Distribution, access, and supporting resources can enhance 
or  reduce  the  individual’s  calorie  availability.  Similarly,  child  malnutrition 
has many determinants, including calorie intake (Rosegrant et al. 2008). The 
relationship used to estimate the number of malnourished children is based on 
a cross-country regression relationship estimated by Smith and Haddad (2000) 
that  takes  into  account  female  access  to  secondary  education,  the  quality 
of maternal and child care, and health and sanitation.108The IMPACT model 
10 Because it is a partial equilibrium model, IMPACT has no feedback mechanisms between 
climate change effects on productivity and income. This means that it cannot estimate directly 
the poverty effects of agricultural productivity declines from climate change. However, 
the reduced form function that relates child malnutrition to calorie availability and other 
determinants implicitly includes the effects of real income change on child malnutrition. Hertel, 
Burke, and Lobell (2010) use a general equilibrium model to estimate explicitly the effects of 
climate change on poverty. They find that the poverty impacts to 2030 “depend as much on 
where impoverished households earn their income as on the agricultural impacts themselves, 
with poverty rates in some non-agricultural household groups rising by 20-50% in parts of Africa 
and Asia under these price changes, and falling by equal amounts for agriculture-specialized 
households elsewhere in Asia and Latin America.”ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   45






 Rank   Kcals per 
day 
Rank  Kcals per 
day 
Rank
Rice  564  1  631  1  713  1 
Wheat 531  2  514  2  214 3 
oils  318  3  262  3  146 5 
Sugarcane 199  4  178  4  77  6 
Maize 148  5  161  5  239  2 
Milk  121  6  91  7  49 9 
Pork  114  7  105  6  26  13 
Vegetables 70  8  68  8  26  14 
Potato 59  9  52  11  25  15 
Subtropical fruits 56  10  55  10  42  11 
Cassava 49  11  57  9  175  4 
Poultry 44  12  32  17  7  19 
Groundnuts 40  13  42  13  39  12 
Beef  40  14  32  16  22 17
Sweet potato 38  15  44  12  43  10 
Sorghum 34  16  39  14  68  7 
Eggs  32  17  28  18  5  22 
Millet 29  18  34  15  58  8 
Sweeteners  23  19  4  25  2  25 
other grains 22  20  21  19  22  16 
Soybeans 17  21  17  20  8 18 
Temperate fruits 15  22  11  22  3  23 
Lamb  10  23  10  23  7  20 
Chickpea  10  24  11  21  5  21 
Pigeonpea  8  25  9  24  2  24 
Total 2,590 2,506 2,041
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on FAoSTAT data.46   CHAPTER 2
Table 2.9  Non-caloric determinants of child malnutrition
Country category






2010 2050 2010 2050 2010 2050
Middle-income countries 86.8 98.4 71.6 81.7 1.066 1.060
Low-income countries 69.0 85.8 54.9 61.6 1.044 1.048
Source:  Authors’  population-weighted  aggregations,  based  on  data  from  2000  with  expert  ex-
trapolations to 2050. original data sources include: the World Health organization’s Global 
Database on Child Growth Malnutrition; the United Nations Administrative Committee on 
Coordination – Subcommittee on Nutrition; the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors; the FAo FAoSTAT database; and the UNESCo UNESCoSTAT database. Aggregations are 
weighted by population shares and are based on the baseline population growth scenario.
Notes:  1. Share of population with access to safe water.
    2.   Total female enrollment in secondary education (any age group) as a percentage of the 
female age group corresponding to national regulations for secondary education.
    3. Ratio of female to male life expectancy at birth.
provides data on per capita calorie availability by country; the other deter-
minants are assumed to remain the same across the overall scenarios. Table 
2.9 shows the 2010 and 2050 values for the non-caloric determinants of child 
malnutrition, aggregated to low- and middle-income countries. The small 
decline in female relative life expectancy in 2050 for the middle-income 
countries is primarily caused by a decline in China, where it is expected 
that male life expectancy will gradually move up, rather than female life 
expectancy moving down.
Table  2.10  summarizes  the  kilocalorie  and  malnourished  children 
outcomes from the overall scenarios. Table 2.11 provides a summary of the 
results from the simulations, which are discussed in more detail below. 
A central result is the importance of economic development in reducing 
child malnutrition. In the optimistic scenario, the number of malnourished 
children in developing countries falls by almost 46 percent between 2010 and 
2050, a decline from 157 million to 85 million. With the pessimistic scenario, 
on the other hand, that number decreases by only 1.8 percent. Similarly, 
for middle-income developing countries, the optimistic scenario results in 
a 50 percent decline in the number of malnourished children; under the 
pessimistic scenario, the decline is only 10 percent. For low-income devel-
oping countries, the decline is 36.6 percent under the optimistic scenario, ASSESSING THE SCENARIo AND SIMULATIoN oUTCoMES   47
Table 2.10    Scenarios results for number of malnourished children and average 
daily kilocalorie availability 
Scenarios
 

























Baseline -25.1 9.8 1,810 0.015 0.4 32.6 0.010
optimistic -45.9 10.3 1,667 0.020 4.7 36.9 0.011
Pessimistic -1.8 8.7 9 0.014 -8.3 30.6 0.010
Low-income developing
Baseline -8.6 9.5 709 0.016 0.8 31.8 0.010
optimistic -36.6 11.5 657 0.022 9.7 36.9 0.011
Pessimistic 18.1 8.6 9 0.015 -6.2 30.1 0.010
Middle-income developing
Baseline -32.3 10.0 1,109 0.015 8.5 33.6 0.015
optimistic -49.9 9.6 1,010 0.018 34.6 45.8 0.016
Pessimistic -10.3 8.7 9 0.013 -5.9 31.0 0.016
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Note:  The standard deviation (std. dev.) and coefficient of variation (CoV) values are for the 
number of malnourished children and daily kilocalorie availability in 2050.
but  under  the  pessimistic  scenario  the  number  of  malnourished  children 
increases by more than 18 percent—an increase of almost 17 million.
Climate change exacerbates the challenges in reducing the number of 
malnourished  children,  although  the  effects  are  mitigated  by  economic 
development.  Climate  change  increases  the  number  of  malnourished 
children  in  2050  relative  to  perfect  mitigation  by  about  10  percent  for 
the optimistic scenario and 9 percent for the pessimistic scenario. In low-
income countries under the optimistic scenario, climate change increases 
the number of malnourished children by 9.8 percent; under the pessimistic 
scenario, by 8.7 percent.48   CHAPTER 2
Table 2.11    Simulation results for average daily kilocalorie availability and 
number of malnourished children



































overall -37.2 -19.1 -16.2 18.9 408.5 15.1
Commercial maize  -27.5 -3.8 -3.2 5.9 60.5 2.2
Developing country 
wheat  -26.8 -2.6 -2.2 5.6 53.7 2.0
Developing country 
cassava  -26.0 -1.4 -1.1 4.2 16.4 0.6
Irrigation -25.4 -0.3 -0.3 3.9 7.7 0.3
Drought in South Asia 




overall -22.6 -6.6 -15.1 26.9 370.9 16.7









Irrigation -8.8 -0.1 -0.2 8.9 6.2 0.3







overall -43.5 -12.5 -16.8 19.6 419.8 14.7
Commercial maize  -33.8 -1.7 -2.2 6.3 47.3 1.7
Developing country 
wheat 
-34.0 -1.9 -2.5 6.7 58.7 2.1
Developing country 
cassava 
-32.7 -0.4 -0.5 4.9 9.0 0.3
Irrigation -32.6 -0.3 -0.4 4.9 8.1 0.3
Drought in South Asia 
2030–2035
-32.7 -0.4 -0.6 5.0 12.4 0.4
Source:  Authors’ calculations.49
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Discussion of Overall Scenarios Results
F
igure  3.1  provides  a  useful  summary  of  the  combined  effects  of 
economic development and climate change on food security. The left 
side of the graph shows the progress on daily kilocalorie availability 
between 2010 and 2050 under the optimistic scenario—that is, high economic 
growth and low population growth; the right side shows outcomes under the 
pessimistic scenario.
Figure 3.1 presents daily average per capita calories available for three 
groups of countries: all developed, all developing, and the 40 low-income 
developing countries. For each group of countries, the top (red, dashed) line 
represents a future with perfect greenhouse gas mitigation. The lines below 
the top line show the outcomes with the different GCM and SRES scenario 
combinations—that is, different climate change scenarios. 
There are three main messages from Figure 3.1 and the results from the 
overall scenarios.
1.  Broad-based  economic  development  is  central  to  improvements  in 
human well-being.
  Per  capita  income  growth  is  a  critical  driver  of  human  well-being.  In 
low-income developing countries average kilocalorie availability is only 
two-thirds of the richest countries today; with high per capita income 
growth and perfect climate mitigation, the availability in 2050 reaches 
almost 85 percent of the developed countries. And because they grow 
more rapidly, the difference in availability among the developing country 
group  diminishes  dramatically.  With  the  pessimistic  overall  scenario, 
however, human well-being declines in all regions.
2.  Climate change offsets some of the benefits of income growth.
  For all regions, the negative productivity effects of climate change reduce 
food availability and human well-being. Climate change results in even 
higher  world  prices  in  2050.  Climate  change  increases  the  number  of 
malnourished  children  in  2050  (relative  to  perfect  climate  mitigation) 50   CHAPTER 3
Figure 3.1    Assessing the impacts of climate change and economic development 









































Source:  Authors’ calculations.111
11 Feedstock use for biofuels production is distinguished as a separate category of demand in 
IMPACT. For these results, biofuel production itself is not modeled, but is represented solely in 
terms of feedstock demand. As a consequence, trade in biofuels is also not directly represented. 
Instead, the share of transport energy assumed to come from biofuels was converted to 
feedstock tonnage and used to adjust the demand side of IMPACT. We assume that beyond 2025 
second-generation biofuels technologies will largely take over, and therefore keep the feedstock 
demands constant at that period. This causes a ‘kink’ to appear in some of the model results 
around 2025.
by  about  10  percent  for  the  optimistic  development  scenario,  and  by 
9 percent for the pessimistic scenario. The effect of climate change in 
the low-income developing countries is similar, increasing the number of 
malnourished children by over 11 percent in the optimistic scenario and 
over 8 percent in the pessimistic scenario.DISCUSSIoN oF oVERALL SCENARIoS RESULTS   51
3.  International trade plays an essential role in compensating for different 
climate change effects.
  Despite large differences in precipitation amounts and seasonal variation 
across the climate scenarios, the differences in price (and other) outcomes 
are relatively small, except for the dramatic effect on international trade 
flows. As Figure 2.15 demonstrates, changes in developed country net 
cereal exports from 2010–2050 range from an increase of 5 million mt 
in the perfect mitigation scenario to a decline of almost 140 million mt. 
The MIRoC scenarios are particularly dry in the central US, resulting in 
much lower 2050 maize and soybean production than the CSIRo scenarios. 
The trade flow changes partially offset local climate change productivity 
effects, allowing regions of the world with less negative effects to supply 
those with more negative effects. This important role for international 
trade can also be seen in the results for the South Asian drought simula-
tion (Figure 4.33).
We turn next to a discussion of the simulations.52
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Discussion of the Simulations
T
he simulations have been chosen to highlight the relative importance 
of different kinds of policy changes and program activities that could 
potentially contribute to meeting the challenges of achieving sustain-
able food production by 2050. We begin with a series of simulations involving 
increases in crop productivity. The initial IPRs are adjusted either by using 
a constant multiplier (1.4 for all developing country IPRs, in the simulation 
of overall productivity improvement) or by increasing them to a rate that 
is  plausible  if  additional  expenditures  on  productivity  enhancements  are 
undertaken (2 percent in selected countries for maize, wheat, and cassava).
Improvements in Overall Productivity
This simulation represents an across-the-board increase in IPRs in developing 
countries  of 40 percent,  relative  to baseline  scenario  values  beginning  in 
2010. Table 4.1 reports the results. Because the productivity increases are 
only  in  developing  countries,  yields  in  developed  countries  actually  fall 
slightly in response to lower world prices (except for irrigated rice). Yields 
in developing countries increase in varying amounts, from 8.9 percent for 
irrigated  rice  in  middle-income  developing  countries  to  28.8  percent  for 
rainfed wheat, also in low-income developing countries.
With  the  productivity  improvements,  world  price  increases  are  15  to   
22 percent less than in the baseline (Figures 4.1–4.4 and Table 4.2). The 
number of malnourished children in 2050 drops by 16.2 percent across all the 
overall productivity scenarios—that is, an additional 19.1 million children who 
are not malnourished.
Improvements in Commercial Maize Productivity
The commercial maize productivity simulation is driven by the estimate from 
private sector sources that hybrid maize yields can be expected to increase 
by 2.5 percent per year at least until the 2030s. The simulation assumes that 
maize yields increase by 2 percent per year to 2050 in the countries that 
currently grow the most hybrid maize: USA, Mexico, China, Europe, France, DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   53




























Maize 13.8  15.4  15.30  -0.7 9.0  10.6   10.3  -2.7
Rice 4.8   6.7   6.68  0.1 4.3   5.7   5.6  -1.6
Wheat  4.5   7.8   7.61  -2.6 3.3   4.9   4.7  -2.8
Middle-income developing
Maize  5.5   7.8   8.82  13.4  3.6   5.4   6.2  15.0
Rice  3.4   4.1   4.71  13.9  2.0   2.8   3.0  8.9
Wheat  3.5   4.6   5.06  11.0  2.2   3.8   4.7  24.5
Low-income developing
Maize  3.5   4.1   4.46  8.6  1.6   2.4   2.8  16.5
Rice  3.2   3.9   4.38  11.1  2.0   2.6   2.9  10.1
Wheat  2.6   4.6   5.67  23.4  2.4   4.8   6.2  28.8
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Brazil,  Argentina,  and  South  Africa.  These  countries  account  for  almost   
80 percent of current maize production.
Figure  4.5  shows  both  the  changes  in  IPRs  from  the  simulation,  for 
countries directly affected, and the effects of climate change. It is useful to 
examine one country in detail. Without climate change and without the effects 
of the simulation, Argentine maize productivity growth is expected to be about 
1 percent per year in the mid-2010s and then gradually decline to zero by 
2050. Climate change reduces the IPRs slightly with the MIRoC GCM. With the 
simulation’s productivity increase to 2 percent, climate change again alters 
the effect somewhat, reducing productivity growth to about 1.8 percent for 
the MIRoC GCM and increasing it to about 2.1 percent for the CSIRo GCM. The 
magnitude of these effects varies by country. In China, for example, climate 
change has essentially no effect on maize IPRs.
The most obvious consequence of this productivity simulation, as Table 4.4 
and Figures 4.6–4.9 indicate, is that the international price of maize increases 
by  only  12  percent  between  2010  and  2050,  instead  of  the  101  percent 
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Table 4.2  Price effects of improvements in overall efficiency
Scenario Maize  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Rice  Wheat 
% price change 2010 mean to 2050 
mean (2050 std. dev. and CoV)
% price change 2050 
baseline to 2050 
higher efficiency








59.8 31.2 20.0 -18.1 -15.1 -21.5
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
The lower maize prices mean higher human consumption and more use 
in animal feed and therefore slightly lower meat prices. The effect is to 
increase  daily  kilocalories  consumed  and  to  reduce  child  malnutrition  by   
3.8 million in 2050, with a slightly greater share in the low-income developing 
countries where direct maize consumption is particularly important.



































Malnourished children Average daily kilocalorie 
availability
Developing
Baseline -25.1     0.4    
overall productivity 
improvement
-37.2 -19.1 -16.2 18.9 408.5 15.1
Low-income developing
Baseline -8.6     6.8    
overall productivity 
improvement
-22.6 -6.6 -15.1 26.9 370.9 16.7
Middle-income developing
Baseline -32.3     8.5    
overall productivity 
improvement
-43.5 -12.5 -16.8 19.6 419.8 14.7
Source:  Authors’ calculations.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   57
Figure 4.5    Intrinsic productivity growth rates (IPRs) for the maize productivity 








2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Argentina
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline








2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Central Europe
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
China
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline








2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
France
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Mexico
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
South Africa
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline








2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
United States
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline
CSIRO experiment MIROC experiment Perfect mitigation experiment
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Improvements in Developing Country Wheat Productivity
In this simulation, wheat IPRs are increased to 2 percent per annum in 
selected  developing  countries that  are  responsible  for a  large  share  of 
wheat  production  in  the  developing  world:  India,  Pakistan,  Argentina, 
Iran, Ukraine, China, and Kazakhstan (see Figure 4.10). These countries 
accounted for about 40 percent of total wheat production in 2010. 
Table 4.4    Price effects of improvement in commercial maize productivity
Scenario Maize  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Rice  Wheat 
% price change 2010 mean to 2050 
mean (2050 std. dev. and CoV)
% price change 2050 











11.9 53.8 50 -44.2 -0.6 -2.8
Source:  Authors’ calculations.




































Malnourished children Average daily kilocalorie 
availability
Developing
Baseline -25.1     0.4    
Commercial maize  -27.5 -3.8 -3.2 5.9 60.5 2.2
Low-income developing
Baseline -8.6     6.8    
Commercial maize  -13 -2.1 -4.8 13.7 104.5 4.7
Middle-income developing
Baseline -32.3     8.5    
Commercial maize  -33.8 -1.7 -2.2 6.3 47.3 1.7
Source:  Authors’ estimates.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   61
Figure 4.10    Intrinsic productivity growth rates (IPRs) for the wheat productivity 
simulation (percent per year)
CSI baseline MIR baseline Perfect mitigation baseline
















2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
China
CSI baseline MIR baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
India
CSI baseline MIR baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Iran
CSI baseline MIR baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Pakistan
CSI baseline MIR baseline Perfect mitigation baseline








2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Ukraine
CSI baseline MIR baseline Perfect mitigation baseline
CSI experiment MIR experiment Perfect mitigation experiment
Source:  Authors’ calculations.62   CHAPTER 4
The  wheat  productivity  simulation  affects  a  smaller  share  of  global 
production  than  the  maize  production  simulation,  so  effects  on  human 
well-being  are  smaller.  As  expected,  the  commodity  showing  the  largest 
price  effect  is  wheat  (see  Figures  4.11–4.14  and  Table  4.6).  Instead  of  a   
54  percent  increase  between  2010  and  2050,  the  increase  is  only   
28 percent with the simulation. The maize price declines slightly, and the 
rice price increases slightly compared to 2050 baseline values.
Wheat consumption is especially important in the middle-income devel-
oping countries, where the simulation results in a 2.6 million reduction in 
the total number of malnourished children in 2050 relative to the baseline. 
In  the  low-income  developing  countries,  there  are  about  704,000  fewer 
malnourished children.
Improvements in Cassava Productivity
Cassava is a particularly important crop for consumers in some low-income 
developing countries. As Table 2.8 shows, for low-income developing coun-
tries, cassava is the fourth most important source of calories and provides 
about 8 percent of average daily consumption of the commodities in IMPACT. 
  For  this  simulation,  cassava  IPRs  are  set  to  2.0  percent  beginning  in 
2015 (or the existing rate if it was greater than 2.0 percent) for the top 
six  cassava-producing  countries  in  2000:  Brazil,  Democratic  Republic  of 
the Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Thailand. These countries 
account for 62 percent of production in 2000. Figure 4.15 shows the original 
and new IPRs adjusted for climate change effects. Unlike the other crops for 
which productivity simulations were undertaken, climate change effects on 
cassava productivity were not done using a crop model. Instead we use the 
average impact on other C3 crops in each FPU. Climate change has the largest 
productivity effects in Brazil, Thailand, and the DRC, reducing the IPRs by as 
much as one percent. By contrast, in Ghana, Nigeria, and Indonesia, climate 
change has almost no effect on productivity. 
Modeling  production,  consumption,  and  trade  of  cassava  is  somewhat 
more complicated than the other crops because the raw product is almost 
always consumed locally. International trade of cassava is in the form of 
either cassava starch or dried, pelletized cassava root for use as an animal 
feed. After the formation of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European 
Union,  the  EU  became  a  major  destination  of  dried  cassava  exports  for 
animal feed (see for example Nelson 1983). More recently, China has become 
the  most  important  buyer  of  internationally  traded  cassava  (Kaplinsky, 
Terheggen, and Tijaja 2010). 
The  cassava  productivity  simulation  results  in  a  10  percent  decline  in 
the world cassava price between 2010 and 2050, instead of the 25 percent DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   63
increase that occurs in the baseline (see Figures 4.16–4.19 and Table 4.8). 
The human well-being benefits are the smallest of the three productivity 
enhancement simulations. The number of malnourished children in 2050 is 
reduced by 1.4 million. one million of these children are in low-income devel-
oping countries; the remainder is in middle-income developing countries.
Table 4.10 presents the effects of the cassava productivity simulation in 
the  countries  where  it  was  implemented.  Production  effects  are  largest  in 
percentage  terms  in  Ghana  and  Indonesia,  but  the  effects  are  also  large  in 
Thailand and Nigeria. The effects on human well-being, on the other hand, 
are largest in the DRC, Ghana, and Nigeria; the remaining countries, which are 
all  middle-income  developing,  show  essentially  no  effect.  For  Thailand,  the 
world’s major exporter of cassava today, the increased production is almost 
entirely exported. For low-income developing countries as a whole, the cassava 
productivity simulation reduces malnutrition by one million children—exceeding 
the benefits of the wheat simulation by about 300,000 children.
Improvements in Irrigation Efficiency
Water  scarcity  is  a  growing  problem  in  much  of  the  world.  Precipitation 
changes that accompany climate change will exacerbate water shortages in 
some parts of the world while increasing water availability in other areas. 
As agriculture is the largest user of fresh water, improvements in irrigation 
efficiency will be essential for sustainable food production as well as for 
meeting increased demands for drinking water and industrial needs. In this 
simulation, we explore the benefits to agricultural production of a 15 percent 
increase in effective irrigation efficiency at the basin level in the developing 
world.12 This simulation only addresses water scarcity in irrigated agriculture, 
and not the larger issues of water scarcity. It focuses on production effects 
where  our  hydrology  model  shows  reduced  yields  in  irrigated  agriculture 
because of water shortages.
Table  4.11  shows  the  relative  importance  of  irrigated  agriculture  by 
region, in 2010 and 2050 for the baseline scenario. In the early 21st century, 
among the major food crops, irrigation is most important for rice. over one-
third of rice production in developed countries and slightly less than one-half 
12 The term “irrigation efficiency” has different meanings at different scales such as an 
irrigation project or a river basin. For this report, we use the standard definitions for “effective 
irrigation efficiency” in the technical irrigation literature (Keller and Keller 1995). “Agricultural 
water use” refers to all consumptive water use for irrigation purposes, including both crop 
evapotranspiration from applied water (“beneficial” use) and losses in conveyance and 
evaporation as well as other non-recoverable losses. The simulation of a 15 percent improvement 
in irrigation efficiency means that up to 15 percent more water is available to the plant for 
evapotranspiration. The water balance analysis is done at the level of major river basins, roughly 
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Table 4.6    Price effects of improvement in developing country wheat 
productivity
Scenario Maize  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Rice  Wheat 
% price change 2010 mean to 2050 
mean  (2050 std. dev. and CoV)
% price change 2050 











97.9 54.4 28.2 -1.4 -0.2 -16.9
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
































Malnourished children Average daily kilocalorie 
availability
Developing
Baseline -25.1     0.4    
Developing country 
wheat 
-26.8 -2.6 -2.2 5.6 53.7 2
Low-income developing
Baseline -8.6     6.8    
Developing country 
wheat 
-10.1 -0.7 -1.6 10.4 36.9 1.7
Middle-income developing
Baseline -32.3     8.5    
Developing country 
wheat 
-34 -1.9 -2.5 6.7 58.7 2.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   67
Figure 4.15    IPRs for the cassava productivity simulation (percent per year)
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline
















2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
DRC
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Ghana
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Indonesia
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Nigeria
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline







2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Thailand
CSIRO baseline MIROC baseline Perfect mitigation baseline
CSIRO experiment MIROC experiment Perfect mitigation experiment
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Table 4.8    Price effects of improvement in developing country cassava 
productivity
Scenario
Maize  Rice  Wheat  Cassava  Maize  Rice  Wheat  Cassava 
% price change 2010 mean to 2050 
mean (2050 std. dev. and CoV)
% price change 2050 baseline 















97.5 54.5 53 -10.2 -1.6 -0.2 -0.8 -28.1
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table 4.9    Human well-being effects of improvement in cassava productivity
Category/scenario
















































-32.7 -0.4 -0.5 4.9 9.0 0.3
Source:  Authors’ calculations.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   71



























Brazil 23,985 26,055 7.9  2,646  2,638  -0.3
DRC 32,915 38,453 14.4  5,218  4,802  -8.0
Ghana 14,859 23,765 37.5   649   604  -6.8
Nigeria 104,714 138,097 24.2  6,449  6,344  -1.6
Thailand 27,396 37,377 26.7   661   659  -0.2
Indonesia 22,235 36,966 39.8  3,759  3,728  -0.8
Source:  Authors’ calculations
Note:  Numbers are based on the mean of the four climate scenarios with the baseline.
Table 4.11    Production of major staples and the share from irrigated harvested 















Developed  18.3   17.3  34.9 35.3
Developing  382.3   399.1  49.8 53.1
Low-income developing  80.5   93.0  27.7 34.0
Middle-income developing  301.9   306.1  56.8 60.3
Maize
Developed  370.2   466.5  15.1 14.6
Developing 400.0  560.2 15.7 19.2
Low-income developing  30.7  42.4  3.0 3.8
Middle-income developing  369.3   517.8  18.3 22.2
Wheat
Developed  212.1   232.6  2.2 2.2
Developing  413.0   555.1  28.9 32.0
Low-income developing  18.4  33.6  13.9 12.2
Middle-income developing  394.6   521.5  29.7 33.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.72   CHAPTER 4
in  developing  countries  is  from  irrigated  systems.  In  contrast,  only  about   
15 percent of maize production is on irrigated land. In developed countries,   
wheat production is almost exclusively rainfed, but in developing countries 
the irrigated share of wheat production is about 30 percent. 
In 2050, the irrigated share increases in the baseline scenario, for most 
crops and most regions. All scenarios have an increasing share of production 
coming from irrigated agriculture for rice and maize. Because so much of 
rice cultivation is already irrigated in 2010, the rate of expansion is relatively 
small:  for  developed  countries,  from  just  under  to  just  over  35  percent; 
and for developing countries, from 50 percent to 53 percent. The irrigated 
maize share is essentially constant in developed countries, at 15 percent; in 
developing countries it increases from 16 percent to 19 percent. For wheat, 
the irrigated share in developed countries is fairly low and remains constant; 
in developing countries the share increases from 29 percent to 32 percent. 
Most of the world’s irrigated area is located in the northern hemisphere, 
predominantly in South Asia and East Asia. Hence, global irrigation water 
use is highest in the northern hemisphere’s summer months, as Figure 4.20 
Figure 4.20    Beneficial irrigation water consumption globally by month, 2010 
and 2050 (cubic km)





















Source:  Authors’ calculations. DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   73
indicates. The effect of greater irrigation efficiency is also highest in those 
months. Globally, the two CSIRo scenarios have slightly more water use than 
the 2010 value (Table 4.12). The MIRoC scenarios result in more irrigation 
water  use  in  2050  as  a  result  of  more  precipitation  and  higher  average 
temperatures. The changes in beneficial water consumption are concentrated 
in South Asia and East Asia (see Table 4.13).
As  the  results  in  Table  4.14  and  Table  4.15  indicate,  the  irrigation 
efficiency improvement has relatively little effect on either global prices or 
human well-being, reflecting the fact that much of the world’s agriculture 
remains rainfed. Rice prices in 2050 decline about 3 percent compared to 
the baseline, wheat prices decline by 1 percent, and maize prices decline 
by 0.9 percent. Developing countries see a small reduction in the number of 
malnourished children. The reason for this can be seen in Table 4.16, which 
reports the increased water use by crops in all developing countries and for 
the three largest beneficiaries of irrigation improvements (India, Pakistan, 
and China). Rice is the predominant irrigated crop in these countries; of the 
three focus crops, rice benefits the most from improvements in basin-level 
effective irrigation efficiency.
As  Table  4.16  and  Figures  4.21–4.25  show,  the  increased  basin  use 
efficiency results in benefits almost entirely in India, Pakistan, and China. 
Seasonally,  in  the  northern  hemisphere  spring  and  summer  are  the  most 
important months; in India, the benefits extend throughout most of the year. 
For China, beneficial irrigation water consumption increases mostly in the 
Huang-Huai-Hai plain in central and northern China. In this region evaporation 
is already high in spring and early summer, but rain does not arrive until July, 
with the East Asia monsoon.
Table 4.12  Global beneficial irrigation water consumption
Scenario
Baseline 2050 with basin efficiency
Total (cubic km) Total  
(cubic km)
Percent increase over 
2050, no basin efficiency 
improvement
2010 526.013
2050 CSIRo B1 567.8 625.7 9.3
2050 CSIRo A1B 560.2 616.3 9.1
2050 MIRoC A1B 620.7 673.6 7.8
2050 MIRoC B1 614.0 664.6 7.6
Source:  Authors’ estimates.74   CHAPTER 4
Table 4.13    Beneficial  irrigation  water  consumption  by  crop  and  changes  with 
improved basin efficiency, A1B scenario (cubic km/year)
Baseline










Wheat 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wheat 2050 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maize 2010 3.9 3.9 4.1
Maize 2050 3.4 3.3 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rice 2010 7.5 7.5 7.5
Rice 2050 5.4 5.7 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
South Asia
Wheat 2010 65.4 65.4 67.7
Wheat 2050 69.5 69.7 79.1 12.3 12.0 14.0
Maize 2010 3.4 3.4 3.4
Maize 2050 4.7 3.6 5.4 0.9 0.8 0.2
Rice 2010 74.4 74.4 75.0
Rice 2050 79.0 73.5 82.4 15.4 14.7 13.0
East Asia
Wheat 2010 16.7 16.7 16.8
Wheat 2050 17.8 17.2 19.1 3.6 2.9 3.6
Maize 2010 13.8 13.6 14.0
Maize 2050 15.9 14.7 17.5 3.2 3.2 2.7
Rice 2010 35.2 35.8 35.2
Rice 2050 22.6 24.4 22.8 1.1 1.0 0.7
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table 4.14  Price effects of improvement in irrigation efficiency
Scenario
Maize  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Rice  Wheat 
% price change 2010 mean to 2050 
mean  (2050 std. dev. and CoV)
% price change 2050 










101.5 50.1 52.5 0.9 -3.1 -1.0
Source:  Authors’ calculations.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   75



































Irrigation -25.4 -0.3 -0.3 3.9 7.7 0.3
Low-income developing
Baseline -8.6     6.8    
Irrigation -8.8 -0.1 -0.2 8.9 6.2 0.3
Middle-income developing
Baseline -32.3     8.5    
Irrigation -32.6 -0.3 -0.4 4.9 8.1 0.3
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table 4.16    Mean increased beneficial agricultural water use due to increased 
irrigation efficiency, 2050 (cubic km)
 Month India Pakistan China
January 0.5 0.0 0.0
February 2.0 0.0 0.0
March 5.3 0.6 0.7
April 4.2 0.9 2.0
May 8.9 0.4 3.0
June 5.7 0.0 3.5
July 0.9 0.5 2.5
August 0.6 1.2 0.2
September 0.8 2.0 0.1
october 1.9 1.5 0.0
November 1.9 0.0 0.0
December 1.2 0.0 0.0
Total 34.0 7.1 11.9
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  The values in the table are the means for the four GCM/climate scenario combinations.76   CHAPTER 4







Figure 4.22    Increase in agricultural water use in 2050, improved irrigation 





15 - 2  5
CSIRO B1 Delta
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Source:  Authors’ calculations.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   77
Figure 4.23    Increase in agricultural water use in 2050, improved irrigation 







Figure 4.24    Increase in agricultural water use in 2050, improved irrigation 







Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.78   CHAPTER 4
Figure 4.25    Increase in agricultural water use in 2050, improved irrigation 







Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Drought in South Asia between 2030 and 2035
Climate change is likely to bring more extreme events, possibly including 
a failure of the monsoon in South Asia. We simulate an extended drought 
beginning in 2030 and continuing through 2035, followed by recovery to the 
previous path of the baseline scenario to 2050. This is done by reducing rainfed 
harvested area to zero in the middle of the drought and then returning it to 
trend by the end of the drought. We assume that only rainfed agriculture 
is affected and that sufficient water is available for irrigated agriculture. 
This assumption in fact underestimates the effects of the drought, because 
irrigation water availability would undoubtedly also be reduced.
Figures 4.26–4.29 show the resulting price pathways for rice, wheat, and 
maize. A key first observation is that the South Asian drought effects spill over 
into world markets. All three commodities show a sharp increase in world price 
during the simulated drought and return to trend afterwards. Table 4.17 reports 
the cumulative effect on prices between 2010 and 2050. Table 4.18 shows no 
remaining  effect  on  malnourished  children  by  2050.  However,  this  summary 
statistic does not capture the full effects of the drought on human well-being, 
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Table 4.17  Price effects of drought in South Asia
Scenario
Maize  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Rice  Wheat 
% price change 2010 mean to 2050 
mean  (2050 std. dev. and CoV)
% price change 2050 








Drought in South Asia 
2030–2035
93.7 55 51.9 -3.5 0.1 -1.5
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
It is useful to trace the process of adjustment to the drought in produc-
tion, consumption, trade, and human well-being, with a focus on the specific 
countries involved—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Three drivers of food 
availability respond to the drop in rainfed area: irrigated area, international 
trade, and domestic consumption. 
Figure 4.30 plots the progression of rainfed area for rice, wheat, and 
maize from 2020 to 2050. Even without the drought, rainfed area declines in 
the baseline scenario as irrigated area expands. With the drought, however, 
producers  respond  by  expanding  irrigated  area  more  and  more  quickly; 
irrigated wheat shows the biggest increase, of over 300,000 hectares. As the 
drought recedes, some of this increased area reverts to rainfed, but irrigated 
area remains higher than it would have been (Figure 4.31).
Despite the increase in irrigated area, production falls, especially that of 
maize (Figure 4.32). 
International trade flows also help to compensate for the drop in rainfed 
area. Without the drought, the region is a small rice exporter (Figure 4.33), 
and  wheat  and  maize  imports  increase.  During  the  drought,  the  region 
becomes a substantial rice importer, and maize imports become much larger. 
Figure 4.34 shows the increase in malnourished children over the baseline 
results. The numbers are largest in 2035 and then diminish. What this analysis 
cannot capture is the loss to the children affected during the drought period. 
They will never fully reach their potential, because of the shortage of food 
during a critical growth stage.DISCUSSIoN oF THE SIMULATIoNS   81



























Malnourished children Average daily kilocalorie availability
Developing
Baseline -25.1     0.4    
Drought in 
South Asia 
2030–2035 -25.5 -0.7 -0.6 4 12.3 0.5
Low-income developing




-9.1 -0.2 -0.6 9.1 12.2 0.5
Middle-income developing




-32.7 -0.4 -0.6 5 12.4 0.4
Source:  Authors’ calculations.82   CHAPTER 4
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Maize Rice Wheat
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4.31    South Asia drought simulation: Change in irrigated area, Bangladesh, 
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Figure 4.32    South Asia drought simulation: Rice, wheat, and maize production, 









Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4.33    South Asia drought simulation: Rice, wheat, and maize net exports, 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (thousand mt)
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Figure 4.34    South Asia drought simulation: Increase in malnourished children 
















his analysis focuses on the period between 2010 and 2050. But we 
would be remiss if we did not point out the nature of the challenges 
beyond 2050. Although population growth is likely to slow or stop 
by 2050, major disparities in income between poor and rich countries will 
still remain, with large numbers of people living in abject poverty. Even in 
the optimistic scenario, the number of malnourished children ranges from 
98  million  to  102  million  (1.3  to  1.5  percent  of  population  in  developing 
countries), depending on climate change scenario.
And  the  threat  of  climate  change  becomes  much  more  severe.  While 
average temperature increases in 2050, across all scenarios, are on the order 
of 1°C relative to the late 20th century, outcomes diverge dramatically in 
the ensuing years, with increases ranging from 2°C to 4°C by 2100. Yields 
of many more crops will be more severely threatened than in the window to 
2050. Table 5.1 shows the changes in wheat yields from climate change in 
2030, 2050, and 2080, relative to yields with 2000 climate. With the climate 
change from 2000 to 2030, yields decline by between 1.3 percent and 9 
percent. By 2050, the range of declines has increased to 4.2 percent to 12 
percent. And by 2080, the declines are much greater, ranging from 14.3 
percent to 29 percent.
Table 5.1    Climate change impacts on wheat yields with 2030, 2050, and 2080 
climate (percent change from 2000)
Year Developed Developing
Wheat Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated
2030 -1.3 -4.3 -2.2 -9.0
2050 -4.2 -6.8 -4.1 -12.0
2080 -14.3 -29.0 -18.6 -29.0
Source:  Authors’ estimates from downscaled CSIRo climate model with the A2 SRES scenario.86   CHAPTER 5
our analysis suggests that to 2050, the challenges from climate change 
are “manageable,” in the sense that possible investments in land and water 
productivity enhancements may partly, or even substantially, mitigate the 
negative effects from climate change. But the challenges of dealing with the 
effects between 2050 and 2080 are likely to be much greater, and possibly 
unmanageable.  Starting  the  process  of  slowing  emissions  growth  today  is 




he challenge of reaching sustainable food security and delivering on 
it through 2050 is daunting. our starting point, in 2010, is a world 
with unacceptable levels of poverty and deprivation, as is clear from 
the 2010 report on the Millennium Development Goals. Progress will be made 
more difficult by two looming challenges: a growing world population and 
increasingly negative productivity effects from climate change. 
Nevertheless, focused efforts can make an enormous difference in reducing 
human suffering by 2050. With sound policies and programs that encourage 
sustainable, broad-based economic growth, and especially continued growth 
in agricultural productivity, our scenarios suggest it is possible to achieve 
a  large  decline  in  the  number  of  malnourished  children—over  45  percent 
over the period from 2010 to 2050. Additional public sector investments in 
agricultural productivity would do even more to reduce suffering. Relative 
to  the  baseline  outcome  in  2050,  a  40-percent  increment  in  productivity 
growth would reduce the number of malnourished children by an additional 
37 percent (that is, by 19.1 million children). 
A key component of this positive future is robust international trade in 
agricultural  products,  especially  given  the  likelihood  of  increased  occur-
rences of extreme weather events in different parts of the world. The price 
spikes of 2008 and 2010 both had important weather components, and during 
each of these periods, trade flows offset some of the locally severe potential 
effects. The remedial role of trade will be increasingly critical in the future. 
Restrictions  on  international  trade,  then,  could  jeopardize  prospects  for 
regional food security.
Climate  change  acts  as  a  threat  multiplier,  making  the  challenges  of 
sustainable food security much more difficult. If the climate of the early 
2000s were to continue through 2050 (an extremely unlikely scenario that 
we  call  “perfect  mitigation”),  we  might  see  an  additional  decline  in  the 
number of malnourished children, on the order of 10 percent. The uncer-
tainty  of  climate  prediction  means  that  climate-specific  investments  are 
not yet appropriate, for the most part. However, supporting investments in 88   CHAPTER 6
physical and human capital can begin immediately as a way of increasing 
the  efficiency  of  land,  water,  and  nutrient  use,  as  essential  factors  in 
growth, climate resilience, and mitigation of agricultural GHGs. The invest-
ments needed to cope with climate change through 2050 seem possible to 
accomplish, at least under conditions of relatively free international trade. 
After 2050, however, the challenge of ever-increasing temperatures becomes 
potentially much greater.
Any modeling outcomes are only as reliable as their underlying data. In 
modeling future food productivity, we must deal with extremely poor data 
sources in critical areas:
•  Biophysical  data—current  climate  and  future  scenarios,  land  use,  soil 
characteristics, ecosystem services
•  Socioeconomic data—demand and supply parameters; links to and from 
agriculture to other sectors; macroeconomic trends
Efforts are underway to address some of these shortfalls. For example, 
the  AfSIS  project  (www.africasoils.net/)  will  greatly  improve  the  data  on 
African soils. There are a variety of efforts underway to improve the quantity, 
quality, and accessibility of weather data, especially in developing countries. 
And  a  new  project—The  Living  Standards  Measurement  Study-Integrated 
Surveys on Agriculture, financed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(http://go.worldbank.org/TNoUo6ZE40)—will improve socioeconomic house-
hold data in Africa. 
Perhaps the most serious deficit is the lack of freely available, regularly 
repeated observations via satellite of the surface of the earth, at temporal 
and spatial resolutions that would make it possible to track changes in agri-
cultural practices and land use more generally. Mechanisms are needed also 
to exploit the potential resource of citizen data-gatherers, equipped with 
GPS-enabled camera phones and other measuring devices. Such data would 
yield huge payoffs in illuminating the state of the world as it unfolds.
Finally, the change process that the CGIAR is undertaking will make it 
possible to exploit more effectively the many potential synergies across the 
centers to better understand human-environment interactions. The modeling 
work reported here will be enriched by newly developed partnerships across 
the CGIAR centers and with researchers around the world to provide early 
guidance on how to direct limited financial resources so that we can sustain-
ably feed a world confronting the challenges of adapting to climate change, 




his  report  uses  two  types  of  country  groupings,  economic  and 
geographic. 
Economic Groups
There  are  three  economic  groups:  low-income  developing,  middle-income 
developing (with these two also aggregated to a fourth group, developing), 
and developed. These economic groups are based on the World Bank clas-
sification scheme as of 2009. Some countries are combined into groups, for 
example countries in the Caribbean and Central America are analyzed as a 
single entity called Caribbean Central America.
Low-income Developing Countries and Country Groups
Afghanistan,  Bangladesh,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Central  African 
Republic,  Chad,  dRC,  eritrea,  ethiopia,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea 
Bissau,  Kenya,  Kyrgyzstan,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique,  Myanmar,  nepal,  niger,  north  Korea,  Rwanda,  Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southeast Asia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Middle-income Developing Countries and Country Groups
Adriatic,  Algeria,  Angola,  Argentina,  Baltic,  Bhutan,  Botswana,  Brazil, 
Cameroon,  Caribbean  Central  America,  Caucus,  Central  europe,  Central 
South  America,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Congo,  djibouti,  ecuador,  egypt, 
Gabon,  india,  indonesia,  iran,  iraq,  ivory  Coast,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan, 
Lebanon,  Lesotho,  Libya,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Mongolia,  Morocco,  namibia, 
nigeria,  northern  South  America,  pakistan,  papua  new  Guinea,  peru, 
philippines, poland, ROW, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay 90   Appendix 1
Developing Countries
This group comprises the combined set of low- and middle-income developing 
countries.
Developed Countries and Country Groups
Alpine europe, Australia, Belgium Luxembourg, British isles, Canada, Cyprus, 
France,  Germany,  Gulf,  iberia,  israel,  italy,  Japan,  netherlands,  new 
Zealand, Scandinavia, Singapore, South Korea, United States
Geographic Groups
The geographic groupings are at continental or subcontinental level. 
Central Africa
Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, dRC, equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon
Western Africa
Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, ivory Coast, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, niger, nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
Eastern Africa
Burundi, djibouti, eritrea, ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Northern Africa
Algeria, egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
Southern Africa
Botswana, Lesotho, namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
North America
Canada, United States
Caribbean and Central America
Caribbean and Central America, Mexico
South America
Argentina, Brazil, Central South America, Chile, Colombia, ecuador, northern 
South America, peru, UruguayReGiOnAL GROUpinGS   91
Middle East
Cyprus, Gulf States, iraq, israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey
Central Asia
Caucasus,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Russia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
South Asia
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, india, iran, nepal, pakistan, Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
indonesia,  Malaysia,  Myanmar,  papua  new  Guinea,  philippines,  Singapore, 
Southeast Asia, Thailand, Vietnam
East Asia
China, Mongolia, north Korea, South Korea
Oceania




Alpine europe, Belgium Luxembourg, France, Germany, netherlands
Northern Europe
Baltic, British isles, Scandinavia
Eastern Europe
Central europe, poland, Ukraine 92
Appendix 2
GDP and Population Scenarios
I
n this section, we report (1) a comparison of the overall scenario Gdp 
and population growth rates with those used in the A1B, A2, and B1 SReS 
scenarios (Table A2.1); and (2) the regional per capita Gdp growth rates 
(Table A2.2). 
note  that  the  SReS  scenarios  were  originally  developed  for  the  third 
ipCC assessment; they were not updated for the fourth. (See www.ipcc.ch/
ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=0.) 
Table A2.1    A comparison of SRES and overall scenario GDP and population 
average annual growth rates, 2010–2050 (percent)
Scenario Population GDP GDP per capita
A1B 0.62 3.99 3.35
A2 1.14 2.38 1.23
B1 0.59 3.28 2.68
pessimistic 1.04 1.91 0.86
Baseline 0.70 3.21 2.49
Optimistic 0.35 3.58 3.22
Source:  http://sres.ciesin.columbia.edu/final_data.html for SReS data and authors’ calculations 
for the overall scenario results.
Many  GCM  datasets  are  available  in  the  public  domain  for  a  range  of 
scenarios,  including  the  three  SReS  scenarios  used  in  the  ipCC’s  Fourth 
Assessment Report (ipCC, parry et al. 2007). This study required GCM-scenario 
combinations for the three climate variables needed to run the dSSAT crop 
models:  precipitation,  maximum  daily  temperature,  and  minimum  air 
temperature. These combinations were available for the following four GCMs, 
from four different research programs14: 
14 documentation about all the models used in the 4th ipCC assessment is available at 
www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/ipcc/model_documentation/ipcc_model_documentation.php.Gdp And pOpULATiOn SCenARiOS   93
•  CnRM-CM3 – Météo-France/Centre national de Recherches Météorologiques, 
France
•  CSiRO-Mk3.0  –  Commonwealth  Scientific  and  industrial  Research 
Organization (CSiRO) Atmospheric Research, Australia 
•  eCHam5 – Max planck institute for Meteorology, Germany 
•  MiROC  3.2,  medium  resolution  –  Center  for  Climate  System  Research, 
University  of  Tokyo;  national  institute  for  environmental  Studies;  and 
Frontier Research Center for Global Change (JAMSTeC), Japan 
These GCMs are here abbreviated as CNRM, CSIRO, ECHAM, and MIROC. 
Table A2.2    Average scenario per capita GDP growth rates by region, 
2000–2050 (percent per year)
Region Pessimistic Baseline Optimistic
Central Africa 2.42 3.92 5.34
Western Africa 2.04 3.63 5.02
eastern Africa 2.72 4.18 5.46
northern Africa 1.78 2.60 3.49
Southern Africa 0.55 2.98 4.44
north America 1.09 2.16 2.41
Caribbean and Central America 2.61 3.03 4.91
South America 2.39 3.20 4.63
Middle east 1.16 2.77 3.68
Central Asia 1.95 4.21 4.94
South Asia 2.61 4.99 5.74
Southeast Asia 2.67 4.49 5.59
east Asia 2.40 4.71 5.77
Oceania 0.54 1.80 2.42
Southern europe 0.51 2.51 2.84
Western europe 0.62 2.58 3.13
northern europe 0.61 2.61 2.95
eastern europe 1.70 3.56 5.02
Rest of world 0.40 2.78 3.15
Low-income developing 2.60 4.10 5.72
Middle-income developing 2.21 4.01 5.11
developing 2.09 3.86 5.00
developed 0.73 2.17 2.56
World 0.86 2.49 3.22
Source:  Authors’ calculations.94   Appendix 2
data for GCM deviations for five time slices were obtained: 1991–2010 
(denoted 2000); 2021–2040 (denoted 2030); 2041–2060 (denoted 2050); 2061–
2080 (denoted 2070); and 2081–2100 (denoted 2090). data were obtained for 
average monthly precipitation and for maximum (tmax) and minimum (tmin) 
temperatures. The mean monthly climatologies for each time slice and for 
each variable were calculated from the original transient daily GCM time 
series. The mean monthly fields were then interpolated from the original 
resolution of each GCM to 0.5 degrees latitude-longitude, using conservative 
remapping (which preserves the global averages). 
We use WorldClim climate data aggregated to five arc-minutes (Hijmans 
et  al.  2005),  as  representative  of  current  climatic  conditions.  Grid  files 
were  produced  for  the  globe  of  climate  normals  for  future  conditions  by 
interpolation, using inverse square distance weighting; these files were used 
to generate the daily data needed (maximum and minimum temperature, 
rainfall, and solar radiation) for each grid cell. This was done using MarkSim, 
a third-order Markov rainfall generator (Jones et al. 2002) that we use as 
a GCM downscaler, as it uses elements of both stochastic downscaling and 
weather typing on top of basic difference interpolation. details are given in 
Jones et al. (2009) and in Jones and Thornton (in preparation). Table A2.3 
reports region-specific summary statistics for these GCMs for the A2 scenario.
Table A2.3    Climate scenario region-specific summary statistics, A2 





















 CnRM-CM3 -5.6 -59.6 2.09  2.21 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 -5.1 -54.4 1.43  1.67 
 eCHam5 -2.7 -28.5 1.88  1.88 
 MiROC 3.2 -11.5 -122.0 2.09  2.66 
Central Africa
 CnRM-CM3 7.3  89.4  2.58  1.90 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 -5.8 -70.9 1.68  1.83 
 eCHam5 2.7  32.4  2.07  2.05 
 MiROC 3.2 0.6  7.9  1.91  1.37 
eastern Africa
 CnRM-CM3 7.8  67.2  2.60  1.85 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 0.9  7.7  1.68  1.63 




















 eCHam5 0.5  4.1  2.05  1.96 
 MiROC 3.2 14.0  120.5  1.89  1.28 
Western Africa
 CnRM-CM3 8.2  51.3  2.75  2.03 
 CSiRO-
Mk3.0
1.9  11.7  2.05  1.73 
 eCHam5 1.3  7.9  2.21  1.98 
 MiROC 3.2 -1.7 -10.9 2.26  1.57 
Southern Africa
 CnRM-CM3 6.3  25.3  2.76  2.09 
 CSiRO-
Mk3.0
-22.3 -89.6 1.66  2.46 
 eCHam5 -19.2 -77.4 2.30  2.50 
 MiROC 3.2 -1.8 -7.1 1.82  1.72 
Northern Africa
 CnRM-CM3 -0.4 -0.7 2.70  2.08 
 CSiRO-
Mk3.0
-3.5 -6.0 1.91  1.67 
 eCHam5 0.8  1.4  2.13  1.92 
 MiROC 3.2 12.8  21.7  2.70  2.43 
Middle East
 CnRM-CM3 -0.2 -0.5 2.68  2.29 
 CSiRO-
Mk3.0
-1.9 -3.9 1.88  1.72 
 eCHam5 -1.7 -3.7 2.33  2.07 
 MiROC 3.2 -5.1 -10.8 2.65  2.57 
Eastern Europe
 CnRM-CM3 -9.6 -56.3 2.27  2.71 
 CSiRO-
Mk3.0
1.8  10.6  1.76  1.82 
 eCHam5 -2.0 -11.9 1.86  1.82 
 MiROC 3.2 5.9  34.6  2.94  3.08 
Oceania
 CnRM-CM3 0.2  1.0  2.33  1.95 
 CSiRO-
Mk3.0
-6.1 -34.7 1.38  1.59 
(Contd…)




















 eCHam5 -0.9 -5.0 1.84  1.76 
 MiROC 3.2 15.5  87.9  1.87  1.57 
North America
 CnRM-CM3 1.0  6.6  2.22  2.10 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 5.3  35.4  2.02  1.79 
 eCHam5 6.2  41.4  2.33  2.01 
 MiROC 3.2 -4.7 -31.5 2.82  3.25 
South America
 CnRM-CM3 1.9  28.7  2.33  2.02 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 0.8  12.4  1.61  1.51 
 eCHam5 -0.2 -3.4 1.92  1.89 
 MiROC 3.2 -4.1 -61.3 2.10  2.42 
South Asia
 CnRM-CM3 2.3  16.5  2.32  1.90 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 -2.8 -20.1 1.90  1.80 
 eCHam5 -0.7 -4.9 2.21  1.96 
 MiROC 3.2 8.9  64.3  2.43  2.04 
Southeast Asia
 CnRM-CM3 -0.2 -5.2 1.82  1.64 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 0.5  11.3  1.39  1.36 
 eCHam5 1.2  29.2  1.64  1.54 
 MiROC 3.2 -1.0 -23.4 1.64  1.48 
Central Asia
 CnRM-CM3 9.6  38.3  2.92  2.55 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 7.5  29.9  2.20  1.91 
 eCHam5 10.7  42.6  3.28  2.76 
 MiROC 3.2 13.3  52.9  3.83  3.52 
East Asia
 CnRM-CM3 -3.5 -17.9 2.36  2.19 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 2.0  10.1  1.88  1.68 
 eCHam5 0.8  4.3  2.35  2.14 
 MiROC 3.2 12.2  62.5  3.08  2.71 
Northern Europe
 CnRM-CM3 5.9  43.7  2.09  1.90 
(Contd…)




















 CSiRO-Mk3.0 8.6  63.7  2.49  2.05 
 eCHam5 6.0  44.1  2.21  1.89 
 MiROC 3.2 10.8  79.5  3.62  3.23 
Southern Europe
 CnRM-CM3 -17.4 -129.1 1.94  2.36 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 -10.2 -75.3 1.35  1.57 
 eCHam5 -8.4 -62.4 1.80  1.93 
 MiROC 3.2 -1.1 -8.4 2.40  2.71 
Western Europe
 CnRM-CM3 -4.6 -37.1 1.78  2.14 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 2.0  15.8  1.47  1.53 
 eCHam5 -4.0 -32.6 1.77  1.93 
 MiROC 3.2 8.9  71.7  2.22  2.34 
Rest of the world
 CnRM-CM3 3.5  52.8  2.11  1.87 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 3.6  55.1  2.13  1.58 
 eCHam5 3.3  51.0  1.56  1.24 
 MiROC 3.2 -2.0 -30.8 2.55  2.19 
World
 CnRM-CM3 19.5  2.7  2.5  2.2 
 CSiRO-Mk3.0 6.5  0.9  1.9  1.8 
 eCHam5 15.0  2.1  2.4  2.2 
 MiROC 3.2 23.4  3.2  2.8  2.6 





odeling  the  impacts  of  climate  change  presents  a  complex 
challenge,  arising  from  the  wide-ranging  processes  underlying 
the  working  of  markets,  ecosystems,  and  human  behavior.  Our 
analytical framework integrates modeling components that range from the 
macro to the micro to model a range of processes, from those driven by 
economics to those that are essentially biological in nature. 
Figure 1.1 provides an illustrative diagram of the links in iFpRi’s iMpACT 
model  between  the  global  agricultural  policy  and  trade  modeling  of  the 
partial  agriculture  equilibrium  model  (with  the  hydrology  and  agronomic 
potential modeling). 
The  modeling  methodology  used  here  reconciles  the  limited  spatial 
resolution of macro-level economic models that operate through equilibrium-
driven relationships (at a national or even more aggregate regional level) 
with detailed models of dynamic biophysical processes. The climate-change 
modeling system combines a biophysical model (the dSSAT crop modeling 
software  suite,  showing  responses  of  selected  crops  to  climate,  soil,  and 
nutrients) with the SpAM dataset of crop location and management tech-
niques (You and Wood 2006), illustrated in Figure A3.1 These results are then 
aggregated and fed into the iMpACT model. 
Crop Modeling
The decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (dSSAT) crop simu-
lation model is an extremely detailed process model of the daily development 
of a crop, from planting to harvest-ready (Jones et al. 2003). it requires daily 
weather data including maximum and minimum temperature, solar radiation, 
and precipitation, as well as a description of the soil, physical and chemical 
characteristics  of  the  field,  and  crop  management  information  including 
crop, variety, planting date, plant spacing, and inputs such as fertilizer and 
irrigation. 
For  maize,  wheat,  rice,  groundnuts,  and  soybeans,  we  use  the  dSSAT 
crop model suite, version 4.5. in mapping these results to other crops in iFpRi’S MOdeLinG MeTHOdOLOGY   99
iMpACT, the primary assumption is that plants with similar photosynthetic 
metabolic pathways will react similarly to any given climate change effect in 
a particular geographic region. Millet, sorghum, sugarcane, and maize all use 
the C4 pathway and are assumed to follow the dSSAT results for maize in the 
same geographic regions. The remainder of the crops use the C3 pathway. 
The climate effects for the C3 crops not directly modeled in dSSAT follow 
the average from wheat, rice, soy, and groundnut from the same geographic 
region, with the following two exceptions. The iMpACT commodities of “other 
grains” and dryland legumes are directly mapped to the dSSAT results for 
wheat and groundnuts, respectively.
Climate Data
Because  dSSAT  requires  detailed  daily  climate  data,  not  all  of  which  are 
readily  available,  various  approximation  techniques  were  developed.  To 
simulate today’s climate we use the WorldClim current conditions dataset 
(www.worldclim.org),  which  is  representative  of  1950–2000  and  reports 
monthly average minimum and maximum temperatures and monthly average 
precipitation. Site-specific daily weather data are generated stochastically 
using the SiMMeTeO software built into the dSSAT software suite. At each 
location, 30 iterations of the dSSAT model were run, and the mean of the 
Figure A3.1  The SPAM dataset development process
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yield values was used to represent the effect of the climate variables. The 
climate data are derived from downscaled GCM projections (discussed above) 
that  provide  monthly  precipitation,  average  minimum  temperatures,  and 
average maximum temperatures for each location. Companion downscaling 
techniques  provide  the  monthly  average  number  of  rainy  days  and  the 
average incident shortwave solar radiation flux.
We assume that all climate variables change linearly between their values 
in 2000 and 2050. This assumption eliminates any random extreme events 
such as droughts or high rainfall periods and also assumes that the forcing 
effects of GHG emissions proceed linearly; that is, we do not see a gradual 
speedup in climate change. The effect of this assumption is to underestimate 
negative effects from climate variability.
Other Agronomic Inputs
Six  other  agronomic  inputs  are  needed:  soil  characteristics,  crop  variety, 
cropping calendar, CO2 fertilization effects, irrigation, and nutrient levels. 
Soil Characteristics
dSSAT uses many different soil characteristics in determining crop progress 
through the growing season. John dimes of iCRiSAT and Jawoo Koo of iFpRi 
collaborated  on  a  classification  of  27  meta-soil  types,  based  on  the  FAO 
harmonized soil map of the world (Batjes, 2009). each soil type is defined by 
three characteristics – soil organic carbon content (high/medium/low); soil 
rooting depth as a proxy for available water content (deep/medium/shallow); 
and major constituent (sand/loam/clay). The dominant soil type in a pixel is 
used to represent the soil type for the entire pixel. 
Crop Variety
dSSAT  includes  many  different  varieties  of  each  crop.  For  the  results 
reported here, we use the following varieties: maize variety Garst 8808; a 
winter wheat variety; a large-seeded Virginia runner type groundnut variety; 
a maturity group 5 soybean variety; and for rice, a recent iRRi indica rice 
variety and a Japonica variety. The rice varieties are assigned by geographic 
area according to whichever is more commonly cultivated within the region. 
Varietal choice is one way in which farmers could adapt to climate change. 
As with other adaptive behavior, this is not costless. Farmers would need to 
gather information about alternate varieties, and seed producers would need 
to assess the performance of their products under varying climate regimes. 
For  this  report,  we  subsume  this  effect  in  the  exogenously  determined 
intrinsic  productivity  growth  rate  assumptions  and  hold  varietal  choice 
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Crop Calendar
Climate change will alter the planting date in some locations, shifting the 
month in which a crop can be safely planted forward or back. Furthermore, 
in some locations crops can be grown in 2000 but not in 2050, or vice versa. 
Three sets of calendars have been developed for use with iMpACT: general 
rainfed crops, general irrigated crops, and spring wheat (see Figure A3.2 to 
Figure A3.7). For rainfed crops, we assume that a crop is planted in the first 
month of a four-month period where monthly average maximum temperature 
does not exceed 37°C (about 99°F), monthly average minimum temperature 
does not drop below 5°C (about 41°F), and monthly total precipitation is not 
less than 60 mm. in the tropics, the planting month begins with the rainy 
season.  The  particular  mechanism  for  determining  the  start  of  the  rainy 
season at any location is to look for the block of 4 months that gets the most 
rainfall. The month before that block is called the beginning of the rainy 
season. For irrigated crops, the first choice is the rainfed planting month. 
When that month is not feasible, a series of special cases is considered for 
South Asia, egypt, and the rest of the northern hemisphere. Otherwise, the 
planting month is based on the dry season.
Spring wheat has a complicated set of rules. in the northern hemisphere, 
the planting month is based on finding a block of months that are sufficiently 
warm but not excessively so. if all months qualify, then the month is keyed off 
the dry season. in the southern hemisphere, spring wheat tends to be grown 
during the meteorological wintertime as a second crop. Hence, the planting 
month depends not on what is optimal for wheat, but on when the primary 
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crop is harvested. Hence, the planting date is based on a shift from the rainfed 
planting month. Failing that, the planting month is based on the rainy season.
For irrigated crops we assume that precipitation is not a constraint and 
only  temperature  matters,  avoiding  freezing  periods.  The  starting  month 
of  the  irrigated  growing  season  is  identified  by  four  contiguous  months 
where  the  monthly  average  maximum  temperature  does  not  exceed  45 
degrees Celsius (about 113 degrees F) and the monthly average minimum 
temperature does not drop below 8.5 degrees Celsius (about 47 degrees F). 
See Figure A3.5 to Figure A3.7.
Source:  Compiled by authors.
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developing a climate-based growing season algorithm for winter wheat 
was  challenging.  Our  solution  was  to  treat  winter  wheat  differently  from 
other crops. Rather than using a cropping calendar, we let dSSAT use planting 
dates throughout the year and choose the date that provides the best yield 
for each pixel.
CO2 Fertilization Effects
plants produce more vegetative matter as atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
increase. The effect depends on the nature of the photosynthetic process 
used by the plant species. So-called C3 plants use CO2 less efficiently than 
C4 plants, so C3 plants are more sensitive to higher concentrations of CO2. 
it remains an open question whether these laboratory results translate to 
actual field conditions. A recent report on field experiments on CO2 fertiliza-
tion (Long et al. 2006) finds that the effects in the field are approximately 
50 percent less than in experiments in enclosed containers. Another report 
(Zavala et al. 2008) finds that higher levels of atmospheric CO2 increase the 
susceptibility of soybean plants to the Japanese beetle and of maize to the 
western corn rootworm. Finally, a recent study (Bloom et al. 2010) finds 
that higher CO2 concentrations inhibit the assimilation of nitrate into organic 
nitrogen compounds. So the actual field benefits of CO2 fertilization remain 
uncertain.
dSSAT has an option to include CO2 fertilization effects at different levels 
of CO2 atmospheric concentration. For this study, all results use a 369 ppm 
setting.
Source:  Compiled by authors.iFpRi’S MOdeLinG MeTHOdOLOGY   105
Our aggregation process—from SpAM pixels and the crop model results   
to iMpACT FpUs—results in some improbable yield effects in a few locations. 
To deal with these, we cap the FpU-level yield increase at 0.53 percent 
annually, or about 30 percent over the period from 2000 to 2050 and limit 
the  negative  effect  of  climate  on  yield  growth  in  iMpACT  to  –2  percent   
per year.
Water Availability
Rainfed crops receive water either from precipitation at the time it falls or 
from soil moisture. Soil characteristics influence the extent to which previous 
precipitation  events  provide water  for growth  in  future  periods. irrigated 
crops  receive  water  automatically  in  dSSAT  as  needed.  Soil  moisture  is 
completely replenished at the beginning of each day in a model run. To assess 
the effects of water stress on irrigated crops, a separate hydrology model is 
used, as described below.
Nutrient Level
dSSAT allows a choice of nitrogen application amounts and timing. We vary 
the amount of elemental n from 15 to 200 kg per hectare, depending on crop, 
management system (irrigated or rainfed), and country.
From DSSAT to the IMPACT Model
dSSAT is run for five crops—rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, and groundnuts—at 
15-arc-minute intervals for the locations where the SpAM dataset shows that 
the crop is currently grown. Other crops are assumed to have productivity 
effects similar to these five crops, as described above. The results from this 
analysis are then aggregated to the iMpACT FpU level.
The IMPACT Model15
The iMpACT model was initially developed at the international Food policy 
Research institute (iFpRi) to project global food supply, food demand, and 
food security to year 2020 and beyond (Rosegrant et al. 2008). it is a partial 
equilibrium  agricultural  model  with  32  crop  and  livestock  commodities, 
including cereals, soybeans, roots and tubers, meats, milk, eggs, oilseeds, 
oilcakes  and  meals,  sugar,  and  fruits  and  vegetables.  iMpACT  has  115 
country (or in a few cases country-aggregate) regions, with specified supply, 
demand, and prices for agricultural commodities. Large countries are further 
15 See Rosegrant et al. 2008 for technical details.106   Appendix 3
divided into major river basins. The result, portrayed in Figure A3.8, is 281 
spatial units called food production units (FpUs). The model links the various 
countries and regions through international trade, using a series of linear and 
nonlinear equations to approximate the underlying production and demand 
relationships. World agricultural commodity prices are determined annually 
at  levels  that  clear  international  markets.  Growth  in  crop  production  in 
each country is determined by crop and input prices, exogenous rates of 
productivity growth and area expansion, investment in irrigation, and water 
availability. demand is a function of prices, income, and population growth. 
We distinguish four categories of commodity demand: food, feed, biofuels 
feedstock, and other uses. 
Figure A3.8    IMPACT model unit of analysis, the food production unit 
(FPU)
Source:  Authors.
Modeling Climate Change in IMPACT
Climate change effects on crop production enter into the iMpACT model by 
altering both crop area and yield. Yields are altered through the intrinsic 
yield growth coefficient, gytni, in the yield equation (1) as well as through the iFpRi’S MOdeLinG MeTHOdOLOGY   107
water availability coefficient (WAT) for irrigated crops. These yield growth 
rates depend on crop, management system, and location. For most crops, 
the average of this rate is about 1 percent per year from effects that are not 
modeled. But in some countries the growth in yield is assumed to be negative, 
while in others it is as high as 5 percent per year for some years.
YC PS PF gy YC WAT tni tni tni
k
tnk tni tni t
iin ikn = × ×∏ × + − β
γ γ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ∆ n ni) 16  (1)
Climate change productivity effects are produced by calculating location-
specific yields for each of the five crops modeled with dSSAT for 2000 and 
2050 climate, as described above, and converting these to a growth rate 
which is then used to shift
tni gy  
by a constant amount. 
Rainfed  crops  react  to  location-specific  changes  in  precipitation  and 
temperature as modeled in dSSAT. For irrigated crops, temperature effects 
are modeled in dSSAT with no water stress. Then water stress from climate 
change is captured as part of a separate hydrology model, a semi-distributed 
macro-scale  hydrology  module  that  covers  the  global  land  mass  (except 
Antarctica and Greenland). it conducts continuous hydrological simulations 
at  monthly  or  daily  time  steps  at  a  spatial  resolution  of  30  arc-minutes. 
The hydrological module simulates the rainfall-runoff process, partitioning 
incoming precipitation into evapotranspiration and runoff that are modulated 
by  soil  moisture  content.  A  unique  feature  of  the  module  is  that  it  uses 
a  probability  distribution  function  of  soil  water-holding  capacity  within  a 
grid cell to represent spatial heterogeneity of soil properties, enabling the 
module  to  deal  with  sub-grid  variability  of  soil.  A  temperature-reference 
method is used to judge whether precipitation comes as rain or snow and 
determines the accumulation or melting of snow (accumulated in conceptual 
snow storage). Model parameterization was done to minimize the differences 
between simulated and observed runoff processes, using a genetic algorithm. 
The model is spun up for five years at the beginning for each simulation run, 
to minimize any arbitrary assumption of initial conditions. Finally, simulated 
runoff and evapotranspiration at 30-arc-minute grid cells are aggregated to 
the 281 FpUs of the iMpACT model.
16 btni - yield intercept for year t, determined by yield in previous year; PStni
- output price in 
year t; PFtni - input prices in year t.ε - input and output price elasticities.108   Appendix 3
One of the more challenging aspects of this research has been to deal 
with spatial aggregation issues. FpUs are large areas. For example, the india 
Ganges FpU runs the entire length of the Ganges River in india. Within an 
FpU, there can be large variations in climate and agronomic characteristics. A 
major challenge was to come up with an aggregation scheme to take outputs 
from the crop modeling process to the iMpACT FpUs. The process we used is 
as follows. First, within an FpU, choose the appropriate SpAM dataset, with 
a spatial resolution of 5 arc-minutes (approximately 10 km at the equator) 
that corresponds to the crop/management combination. The physical area 
in the SpAM dataset is then used as the weight to find the weighted-average 
yield across the FpU. This is done for each climate scenario (including the 
no-climate-change scenario). The ratio of the weighted-average yield in 2050 
to the no-climate-change yield is used to adjust the yield growth rate in 
equation (1) to reflect the effects of climate change.
in some cases the simulated changes in yields from climate change are 
large and positive. This usually arises from one of two causes: (1) starting 
from  a  low  base  (which  can  occur  in  marginal  production  areas);  and   
(2) unrealistically large effects of carbon dioxide fertilization.
Harvested areas in the iMpACT model are also affected by climate change. 
in any particular FpU, land may become more or less suitable for any crop and 
will impact the intrinsic area growth rate, 
tni ga , in the area growth calcula-
tion. Water availability will affect the WAT factor for irrigated crop area. 
AC PS PS ga AC WA tni tni tni
j i
tnj tni tni
iin ijn = × ×∏ × + −
≠
α
ε ε ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ∆ T Ttni)   (2)
Crop calendar changes due to climate change cause two distinct issues. When 
the crop calendar in an FpU changes, such that a crop that was grown in 2000 
can no longer be grown in 2050, we implement an adjustment to 
tni ga  that 
will bring the harvested area to zero—or nearly so—by 2050. However, when 
it becomes possible to grow a crop in 2050 where it could not be grown in 
2000, we do not add this new area. For example, parts of Ontario, Canada 
that have too short a growing season in 2000 will be able to grow maize in 
2050, according to the climate scenarios used. As a result our estimates of 
future production are biased downward somewhat. The effect is likely to be 
small, however, as new areas have other constraints on crop productivity, 
particularly soil characteristics.
As metrics for the state of human well-being, we use average per capita 
calorie consumption as well as an associated measure, the number of malnour-
ished children under five. We use the underweight definition of malnutrition, 
that is, the proportion of children under five falling below minus-2 standard iFpRi’S MOdeLinG MeTHOdOLOGY   109
deviations from the median weight-for-age standard set by the U.S. national 
Center for Health Statistics and the World Health Organization.17 
Estimating Child Malnutrition
The iMpACT model provides data on average per capita calorie availability by 
country. Child malnutrition has many determinants, of which calorie intake 
is one. The percentage of malnourished children under the age of five is 
estimated from several variables: the average per capita calorie consump-
tion,  female  access  to  secondary  education,  the  quality  of  maternal  and 
child care, and health and sanitation (Rosegrant et al. 2008). The precise 
relationship used to project the percentage of malnourished children is based 
on a cross-country regression relationship of Smith and Haddad (2000), and 
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where 
MAL   =  percentage of malnourished children
KCAL  =  per capita kilocalorie availability
LFEXPRAT   =  ratio of female to male life expectancy at birth
SCH   =  total female enrollment in secondary education (any age 
group) as a percentage of the female age group corre-
sponding to national regulations for secondary education 
WATER   =  percentage of population with access to safe water 
, 2000 ∆t t    =  the difference between the variable values at time t and 
the base year t2000 
data on the percentage of malnourished children (MAL) are taken from the 
World development indicators. Other data sources include the FAO FAOSTAT 
database, and the UneSCO UneSCOSTAT database. 
NMAL MAL POP t t t = × 5
where NMAL =number of malnourished children, and
POP5 = number of children 0−5 years old in the population.
17  Two alternate definitions of malnutrition are: 
    Stunting – low height for age; height for age more than a standard deviation of 2 below the 
median value of the reference (healthy) population 
    Wasting – low weight for height; weight for height more than a standard deviation of 2 
below the median value of the reference (healthy) population.110   Appendix 3
For this report, we assume that life expectancy, maternal education, and 
clean water access values improve over time but do not change across the 
scenarios.
Irrigation Efficiency Improvements
improvements in irrigation efficiency are a potentially important source of 
agricultural productivity improvements, especially as water scarcity becomes 
a worldwide problem. in iMpACT, the concept of basin efficiency (BE) is used 
to account for changes in irrigation efficiency within a river basin (n. Haie 
and A. A. Keller 2008; A. Keller and J. Keller 1995). it fully accounts for the 
portion of diverted irrigation water that returns to rivers or aquifer systems 
and can be reused repeatedly by downstream users. This approach avoids the 
limitation of the classical irrigation efficiency concept that treats return flow 
as “losses.” 
BE is defined as the ratio of beneficial irrigation water consumption (BC) 
to total irrigation water consumption (TC). That is, changes in precipitation 





BE in the base year is calculated as the ratio of the net irrigation water 
demand  (NIRWD)  to  the  total  irrigation  water  consumption  based  on 
Shiklomanov (1999). NIRWD is defined as
NIRWD kc ET PE AI
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Variables are defined as follows:
•  cp—index for the iMpACT crop 
  includes all iMpACT crops that receive irrigation.
•  st—index for the crop growth stages 
  FAO  has  divided  the  crop  growing  period  into  four  stages,  each  with 
separate crop coefficient (kc) values. See Allen et al. (1998) for details.
•  kc —crop coefficient 
  each crop growth stage is associated with a corresponding crop coefficient 
(Allen et al. 1998) that adjusts reference eT for the characteristics of a 
particular crop.
•  ET0 —reference evapotranspiration 
  evapotranspiration describes the sum of evaporation and plant transpira-
tion from the earth’s land surface to atmosphere. evaporation accounts iFpRi’S MOdeLinG MeTHOdOLOGY   111
for the movement of water to the air from sources such as the soil, canopy 
interception, and water bodies. Transpiration accounts for the movement 
of water within a plant and the subsequent loss of water as vapor through 
stomata in its leaves. Reference evapotranspiration is defined as the ET 
that occurs from a standardized “reference” crop, such as clipped grass 
or alfalfa.
•  PE—effective rainfall (rainfall that is actually available for plant growth)
•  AI
cp —irrigated area for crop cp in the basin
This calculation generates globally consistent estimates for Be for the base 
year. 
For  the  future,  we  project  small  enhancements  in  BE,  with  levels 
increasing to 0.5–0.8 by 2050 under the baseline. An upper level of BE is set 
at 0.85 as a practical maximum. 112
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Comparing IFPRI Food Security and Climate Change 
Results: What has Changed?
I
n  late  2009,  iFpRi  researchers  prepared  two  major  reports  in  the 
impacts of climate change on agriculture: a book released by the Asian 
development  Bank  (Rosegrant  et  al.  2009);  and  an  iFpRi  Food  policy 
Report  (nelson  et  al.  2009).  Roughly  one  year  later,  many  of  the  same 
researchers contributed to the present iFpRi research monograph (referred 
to  here  as  RM10).  during  the  intervening  year,  substantial  improvements 
were made to the various components of the iMpACT modeling system that 
generates scenario results to 2050. 
One consequence of those improvements is that the results are not strictly 
comparable. in this Appendix, we compare selected results from the Food 
policy Report (referred to here as FpR09) with the results reported in RM2010 
and document some of the key changes that resulted in those differences. We 
focus on the main crops rice, wheat, and maize, as well as the malnourished 
children results. Since FpR09 only used one set of income and population 
drivers, we compare its results with the baseline scenario of the RM10 report. 
(FpR09 also includes a pessimistic and optimistic scenario). The climate GCMs 
differ between the two reports, so, for the most part, we report differences 
in the perfect mitigation (no climate change) results. Table A4.1 reports the 
price scenarios for maize, rice, and wheat for the two publications. Table 
A4.2  reports  the  malnourished  children  outcomes.  The  main  RM10  report 
includes results only from 2010. However, since the simulations begin in 2000 
and the FpR09 report does not include 2010 results, we include year 2000 
results in this Appendix.
There are two main differences between the two sets of outcomes. The 
price increases with perfect mitigation are substantially larger in the RM10 
report than in the FRp09 report. However, climate change in the RM10 report 
generally results in less negative productivity effects (averaged across the 
four  GCM/SReS  scenario  climate  changes),  so  the  combined  price  effects 
result in smaller price increases for rice and wheat in the RM10 report. COMpARinG iFpRi FOOd SeCURiTY And CLiMATe CHAnGe ReSULTS: WHAT HAS CHAnGed?   113


















Maize 119.3 196.2 261.4       9.6    10.5 
Rice 240.0 330.4 383.7    3.4     0.2 
Wheat 147.5 211.3 259.2   10.6     10.2 
FPR09 results
Maize 111.1 179.0 236.7
Rice 238.5 319.6 382.9
Wheat 145.8 191.0 235.1
Source:  Authors’ estimates.
note:  Climate change values are the mean of the two climate change scenario results in FpR09 
and the 4 climate change scenarios of RM10. 
Table A4.2    Number of malnourished children in developing countries 
(million)




All developing countries, RM10 155.2 106.7 118.3
All developing countries, FpR09 148.3 112.9 137.5
Source:  Authors’ estimates.
Three drivers account for the bulk of these differences: differences in 
Gdp, population, and climate change modeling methodology.
Differences in GDP
For the FpR09 report we relied on the Gdp growth rates used in the World 
Bank’s eACC report. A subsequent assessment was that several of the rates 
were implausibly small for the baseline, especially in Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Table  A4.3  reports  the  growth  rates  used  in  the  two  reports  for 
countries where the rates were changed. The consequence of these changes 
for world Gdp and agricultural demand is quite significant, since the changes 
are all in developing countries. For the FpR09 report, average annual world 
Gdp growth from 2000 to 2050 was 3.03 percent. For the RM10 report, the 
rate is 3.13 percent.114   Appendix 4
Table A4.3    GDP growth rates from 2000 to 2050 and changes (average 
annual rate, percent)
  RM10 FPR09 Difference
Vietnam 6.97 4.42 2.55
Mozambique 6.39 3.99 2.41
Southeast Asia 7.06 4.82 2.24
Tanzania 6.33 4.18 2.15
Uganda 6.91 4.82 2.09
Zambia 5.83 3.82 2.01
ethiopia 5.88 3.98 1.9
Rwanda 6.07 4.18 1.89
Ghana 5.57 3.7 1.87




namibia 5.22 3.47 1.75
Kenya 5.85 4.11 1.73
Congo 5.87 4.14 1.73
Cameroon 5.38 3.7 1.68
Chad 7.12 5.5 1.63
Malawi 5.46 3.86 1.61
Swaziland 4.39 2.79 1.6
ivory Coast 4.88 3.29 1.59
Gabon 5.1 3.51 1.58
Lesotho 4.17 2.59 1.58
Madagascar 5.33 3.86 1.48
Senegal 5.5 4.04 1.46
Burkina Faso 5.87 4.45 1.42
eritrea 5.48 4.07 1.41
  RM10 FPR09 Difference
Togo 5.14 3.73 1.41
Gambia 5.32 3.97 1.36
Mali 6.09 4.75 1.34
indonesia 5.45 4.16 1.29
Guinea 5.35 4.13 1.22
Angola 6.57 5.35 1.22
Thailand 5.07 3.88 1.2
Botswana 4.9 3.7 1.19
pakistan 5.73 4.64 1.09
nigeria 5.11 4.02 1.09








Benin 5.35 4.35 1.00
india 6.41 5.45 0.96
philippines 5.44 4.5 0.94
Bangladesh 5.12 4.23 0.89
niger 5.7 5.03 0.67
Liberia 4.23 3.76 0.47
Zimbabwe 2.6 2.14 0.45
South Africa 3.23 2.92 0.31
Malaysia 4.93 4.69 0.24
World 3.03 3.16 0.13
Differences in Population
The RM10 report relies on the most recent data from the Un on population 
projections (downloaded in 2010). The FpR09 report used an earlier set of 
population data. Table A4.4 reports the differences for selected countries 
and for the world. World population in 2050 is 28 million less with the RM10 
data  than  the  FRp09  data.  For  the  most  part  the  changes  are  small  and 
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relatively evenly distributed and will have small effects on prices. But four 
important developing countries have relatively large absolute increases in 
population: dR Congo, india, Brazil, and Bangladesh – together accounting for 
144 million additional people in 2050. The latter three countries are impor-
tant consumers of rice, wheat, and maize, and so these population increases 
will contribute to higher prices. The three countries losing the most people 
in the 2050 scenario are China, pakistan, and Tanzania, losing a combined 69 
million people in the 2050 scenario.
Table A4.4    2050 population projection changes for selected countries, 
RM10-FPR09 (million)
Name 2050



















Source:  Authors’ estimates.
Changes in Modeling the Effects of Climate Change
The techniques used to model the effects of climate change on agricultural 
productivity in iMpACT have seen three substantial changes in the recent 
past. prior to the analysis that resulted in the FpR09 report, productivity 
effects were obtained from outside sources. They tended to have very coarse 
spatial resolution and utilized a very limited set of possible future climates. 
The techniques used beginning with the FpR09 report and the AdB book have 
much higher spatial resolution, show a wider variety of future climates, and 
can be relatively easily updated when new climate data become available. 
For the FpR09 report, the modeling approach used a very basic working, 
if  awkward,  system  that  supplied  iMpACT  with  indicators  of  agricultural 
productivity changes for two different climate scenarios across the entire 
globe – the AR4 CSiRO and nCAR GCMs with results for the A2 SReS greenhouse 
gas emissions pathways scenario.
The  RM10  report  revamped  the  actual  running  of  the  crop  models 
to  more  easily  interface  with  the  GiS  portion  and  allow  for  streamlined 116   Appendix 4
troubleshooting. in addition, different GCMs and scenarios were used – the 
CSiRO  and  MiROC  GCMS  with  the  A1B  and  A2  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
pathway scenarios. in addition, a variety of modeling methods were modified 
or added to make the simulations more realistic. 
Crop Model Version
The actual crop modeling code used in the two phases differed. The FpR09 
used the official, released dSSAT version 4.0. For the RM10 report, a recent 
beta version of 4.5 was employed. 
Climate Data
For both reports, the years compared were approximately 2000 and approxi-
mately 2050.
The FpR09 report used WorldClim downscalings for the baseline. The two 
future climates were constructed by taking the raw (geographically coarse) 
anomalies and adding them to the WorldClim baselines. WorldClim does not 
include information about the number of rainy days or incident solar short-
wave radiation needed for the crop modeling. This meant that the “number 
of rainy days in a month” and “typical shortwave solar radiation by month” 
had to be obtained elsewhere. These were constructed from the nASA/LdAS 
historical assimilated data. A non-linear regression technique was developed 
to characterize a cross-sectional relationship between the number of rainy 
days and the available WorldClim data (rainfall and temperature), elevation, 
and latitude. These relationships were then used to make projections of the 
rainy days under the future climates by plugging in the values for the future 
rainfalls and temperatures. The climates used were the A2 GHG pathway 
scenarios  for  the  nCAR  and  CSiRO  GCMs  (AR4  anomalies  plus  WorldClim 
baseline).
The RM10 report results still used the WorldClim 2000 dataset for the base-
line, but used the Thornton/Jones downscaling methodology (“FutureClim”) 
for the 2050 climate scenarios, which also provides estimates for the number 
of rainy days and the shortwave radiation.
it  is  difficult  to  do  a  direct  comparison  between  the  WorldClim  and 
FutureClim datasets, but there are differences. For example, the minimum 
temperature for September 2050 for the CSiRO GCM with the A2 scenario is 
about 0.1 degrees lower on average for the WorldClim derived product than 
the FutureClim product, a relatively small amount. The differences for the 
rainy days and shortwave radiation are much more significant. For example, 
there are many locations with 9 to 12 days difference in the number of rainy 
days in the month. With shortwave radiation data, there are many locations 
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Our assessment is that the Thornton/Jones FutureClim downscaling tech-
niques are more reliable and internally coherent than the WorldClim-based 
data, and hence the climate inputs into dSSAT for RM10 are better than those 
used for FpR09.
Crop Varieties
The  crop  varieties  used  in  both  sets  of  scenarios  are  the  same  with  the 
exception of wheat. Wheat is a difficult crop to model, most importantly 
because of the two major types of wheat and their production schedules: 
winter wheat and spring wheat. The iMpACT does not differentiate between 
these types of wheat. However, for the crop modeling, a particular variety 
needs to be specified. Based on the knowledge available when the FpR09 
report was being prepared, a winter wheat variety was chosen. The difficulty 
in establishing an appropriate planting month by location led to a strategy of 
planting in every month and choosing the highest yielding month.
Subsequent experimentation into the modeled behavior of several wheat 
varieties in dSSAT, along with improved knowledge of wheat in general, led 
to a revision of the treatment of wheat in the RM10 report. The winter wheat 
variety was replaced by a spring wheat variety. We looked at how the yield 
responded when the planting month was changed and discovered that the 
winter wheat variety acted like an ill-behaved spring wheat rather than like 
a true winter wheat. Furthermore, it appears that spring wheat varieties are 
grown in a wider geographic area than winter wheat varieties. With further 
experimentation it seems likely that, although wheat is often grown during 
meteorological  winter,  spring  varieties  are  most  common:  for  example, 
in much of india it is too hot to grow wheat during the summer. Thus, we 
thought that a spring wheat variety would better represent global behavior 
than a poorly defined winter wheat variety. The planting month strategy was 
also changed from choosing among all months (which often shows clearly 
spurious highest yielding months) to targeting a particular planting month.
Planting Dates
The FpR09 approach to planting dates was to identify the planting month via 
a set of rules based on the monthly climate variables. For example, for most 
rainfed crops, the planting month is the first month after September that 
begins a block of four months with temperatures that are in the range the 
crop can tolerate and that also have at least a minimum amount of rainfall. 
These rules were applied to each of the climate scenarios to determine a 
planting date. 
The  RM10  report  employed  different  climate  data,  so  the  rules  had 
to be recalibrated. More expert input was used to inform the calibration 118   Appendix 4
process. This allowed the rules to be modified and expanded to better match 
the evidence about when different crops are planted around the world. in 
particular, this allowed for an improved determination of planting dates for 
spring wheat. To allow greater flexibility, the target month identified by the 
rules is used as the middle of a three-month window. All three months are 
modeled separately and the final yield is chosen to be the highest yield of 
the three months.
An important issue is the number of weather realizations used to deter-
mine the mean yield values. The FpR09 used 15 realizations in most cases. 
For the RM10 report, 40 repetitions were used for two planting dates within 
the month for a total of 80 repetitions (and another 160 for the unused, lower 
yielding planting months).
Water Management
Water management is especially important for irrigated rice. in the FpR09, 
irrigated  rice  was  treated  just  like  all  other  irrigated  crops.  That  is,  a 
particular soil layer was maintained at a target level of moisture. The RM10 
report improved on this by implementing the rice-specific irrigation controls 
in dSSAT that allowed for a flooded paddy scheme (raising and lowering the 
water depth, for example).
Initial Conditions
The initial moisture and nitrogen conditions in the soil can be quite important 
in determining final yields. For crops tolerant of relatively dry conditions, 
starting out with significant amounts of soil moisture (which is the dSSAT 
default)  can  allow  for  seemingly  abundant  rainfed  yields,  even  in  loca-
tions  known  to  have  virtually  no  annual  rainfall.  Such  results  are  clearly 
problematic.
The FpR09 did not attempt to set the initial soil conditions. The default 
is  to  start  with  the  maximum  possible  soil  moisture  content  that  can  be 
held without draining away, and this gave inappropriate levels of moisture 
availability in some dryland areas. in the RM10 report, a heuristic was imple-
mented to allow for control of the initial soil moisture and nitrogen content 
so they could be set to a more reasonable level.
Geographic Coverage
The geographic details also changed between the two phases. Both used the 
SpAM  product  to  identify  locations  for  modeling  for  each  crop.  However, 
between the FpR09 and RM10 reports, the SpAM product itself was upgraded 
and  improved,  resulting  in  a  different  set  of  geographic  locations  and 
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in addition, for the FpR09 report, the effective spatial resolution was 
chosen as half-degree pixels over only the most important regions identified 
by SpAM for each crop and a very small region around them. For the RM10 
report,  the  spatial  resolution  improved  to  quarter-degree  pixels  covering 
the entirety of the pixels identified by SpAM as having any production at all 
(however small) for each crop. This resulted in greater coverage at a higher 
resolution and more appropriate choice of soil type for the simulation.
Summary of the Changes
numerous changes were made in the modeling and data used between the 
two reports. The two most significant were likely the income growth rates 
and  the  climate  change  modeling.  Global  income  growth  was  increased 
substantially—with all the increase in developing countries. This is undoubt-
edly responsible for at least some part of the higher prices observed in the 
RM10 report with perfect climate mitigation. it also accounts for the slightly 
smaller  number  of  malnourished  children  in  2050  with  perfect  mitigation 
in the RM10 report. The price increases resulting from the income-induced 
increased demand offset to some extent the favorable effect of the income 
increases on child malnutrition. Because the simulated negative productivity 
effects of climate change are smaller in the RM10 report, the difference in 
the number of malnourished children is also smaller.
This  type  of  modeling  is  still  in  its  infancy—combining  very  detailed, 
process-based climate change productivity effects with a water demand and 
supply model, all incorporated into a detailed economic model of world agri-
culture. We are in the process of improving several aspects of the modeling 
process to more accurately capture the relevant complexity that determines 
global food security. in that sense this monograph should be seen as a status 
report of an ongoing process of research discovery. References
Ainsworth, E. A., A. D. B. Leakey, D. R. Ort, and S. P. Long. 2008. FACE-ing the facts: 
inconsistencies and interdependence among field, chamber and modeling stud-
ies of elevated CO2 impacts on crop yield and food supply. New Phytologist 
179 (1): 5–9.
Batjes, N, K Dijkshoorn, V. Van Engelen, G. Fischer, A. Jones, L. Montanarella, M. 
Petri,  et  al.  2009.  Harmonized  world  soil  database.  Laxenburg,  Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Bloom, A. J., M. Burger, J. S. Rubio Assensio, and A. B. Cousins. 2010. Carbon dioxide 
enrichment inhibits nitrate assimilation in wheat and arabidopsis. Science 328: 
899–902.
De Fraiture, C., D. Wichelns, J. Rockström, E. Kemp-Benedict, N. Eriyagama, L. J. 
Gordon, M. A. Hanjra, J. Hoogeveen, A. Huber-Lee, and L. Karlberg. 2007. 
Looking ahead to 2050: Scenarios of alternative investment approaches. In 
Water for food, water for life: A comprehensive assessment of water man-
agement in agriculture, ed. David Molden. London: Earthscan, and Colombo: 
International Water Management Institute.
Easterling, W. E., P. K. Aggarwal, P. Batima, K. M. Brander, L. Erda, S. M. Howden, A. 
Kirilenko, J. Morton, J.-F. Soussana, J. Schmidhuber and F. N. Tubiello. 2007. 
Food, fibre and forest products. In Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation 
and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment 
report of the IPCC, ed. M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der 
Linden and C.E. Hanson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Evenson, R., and M. W. Rosegrant. 1995. Productivity projections for commodity mar-
ket modeling. New Haven: Yale University Economic Growth Center. 
Hertel, T. W., M. B. Burke, and D. B. Lobell. 2010. The poverty implications of climate-
induced  crop  yield  changes  by  2030.  Global  Environmental  Change.  GTAP 
Working Paper 59. West Lafayette, Ind.: Global Trade Analysis Project. 
Hijmans, R. J., S. E. Cameron, J. L. Parra, P. G. Jones, and A. Jarvis. Very high resolu-
tion interpolated climate surfaces for global land areas. International Journal 
of Climatology 25 (2005): 1965-1978.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Climate change 2007: The physical 
science basis. Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Figure 104. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press.
Jones, J. W., G. Hoogenboom, C. H. Porter, K. J. Boote, W. D. Batchelor, L. A. Hunt, 
P. W. Wilkens, U. Singh, A. J. Gijsman, and J. T. Ritchie. 2003. The DSSAT 
cropping system model. European Journal of Agronomy 18 (3-4): 235-265.
Jones, P. G., and P. K. Thornton. 2010. Generating and applying downscaled weather 
data from a suite of climate models. In process.
120 120 120Jones,  P.  G.,  P.  K.  Thornton,  and  J.  Heinke.  2010.  Characteristically  generated 
monthly climate data using downscaled climate model data from the fourth 
assessment  report  of  the  IPCC.  http://futureclim.info/.  Dataset  accessed 
August 2010. 
Jones, P. G., P. K. Thornton, W. Diaz, and P. W. Wilkens. 2002. MarkSim: A computer 
tool that generates simulated weather data for crop modeling and risk assess-
ment. Cali, Colombia: CIAT.
Kaplinsky, R., A. Terheggen, and J. Tijaja. 2010. What happens when the market shifts 
to China? The Gabon timber and Thai cassava value chains. Policy Research 
Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/02/11/000158349_20
100211121403/Rendered/PDF/WPS5206.pdf. Accessed August 2010.
Keller, A., and J. Keller. 1995. Effective efficiency: A water use efficiency concept for 
allocating freshwater resources. Discussion Paper No. 22. Arlington, Virginia: 
Winrock International.
Liefert, W, O. Liefert, G. Vocke, and E. Allen. 2010. Former Soviet Union region to 
play larger role in meeting world wheat needs. Amber Waves 8 (2). <http://
www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/june10/features/fsuwheat.htm>.  Accessed 
August 2010.
Long, S. P., E. A. Ainsworth, A. D. B. Leakey, J. Nosberger, and D. R. Ort. 2006. Food 
for thought: Lower-than-expected crop yield stimulation with rising CO2 con-
centrations.  Science  312  (5782):  1918-1921.  <http://www.sciencemag.org/
cgi/content/abstract/312/5782/1918>. Accessed August 2010.
Manning, M. R., J. Edmonds, S. Emori, A. Grubler, K. Hibbard, F. Joos, M. Kainuma, R. 
F. Keeling, T. Kram, A. C. Manning, M. Meinshausen, R. Moss, N. Nakicenovic, 
K.  Riahi,  S.  K.  Rose,  S.  Smith,  R.  Swart,  and  D.  P.  van  Vuuren.  2010. 
Misrepresentation of the IPCC CO2 emission scenarios. Nature Geoscience 3 
(6): 376-377. http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/ngeo880. Accessed 
August 2010.
Margulis, S., U. Narain, P. Chinowsky, L. Cretegny, G. Hughes, P. Kirshen, A. Kuriakose, 
et al. 2010. Cost to developing countries of adapting to climate change: New 
methods and estimates. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
McCalla,  A.  F.,  and  C.  L.  Revoredo.  2001.  Prospects  for  global  food  security:  A 
critical appraisal of past projections and predictions. 2020 Vision for Food, 
Agriculture,  and  the  Environment  Discussion  Paper  35.  Washington,  D.C.: 
International Food Policy Research Institute.
Meehl, G. A., T. F. Stocker, W. D. Collins, P. Friedlingstein, A. T. Gaye, J. M. Gregory, 
A. Kitoh, et al. 2007. Global climate scenarios. In Climate change 2007: The 
physical science basis, ed. S. D. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. 
Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H. L. Miller. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge  University  Press.  <http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/
ar4/wg1/en/ch10.html>. Accessed August 2010.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and human well-being, Vol. II: 
Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Nelson, G. C. 1983. Time for tapioca, 1970 to 1980: European demand and world sup-
ply of dried cassava. Food Research Institute Studies XIX (1): 25-49.
REFERENCES   121Nelson, G. C., M. W. Rosegrant, J. Koo, R. Robertson, T. Sulser, T. Zhu, C. Ringler, 
et al. 2009. Climate change: Impact on agriculture and costs of adaptation. 
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Parry, M. L., C. Rosenzweig, Iglesias, A., Livermore, M. and G. Fischer. 2004. Effects 
of climate change on global food production under SRES emissions and socio-
economic scenarios. Global Environmental Change 14 (1): 53-67.
Raskin, P., F. Monks, T. Ribeiro, D. van Vuuren, and M. Zurek. 2005. Global scenarios 
in  historical  perspective.  In  Ecosystems  and  human  well-being,  Volume  2: 
Scenarios. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Reilly, J., N. Hohmann, and S. Kane. 1994. Climate change and agricultural trade : 
Who benefits, who loses? Global Environmental Change 4 (1): 24-36.
Rosegrant et al. 2009. Building climate resilience in the agriculture sector. Manila, 
Philippines and Washington, D.C.: Asian Development Bank and International 
Food Policy Research Institute.
Rosegrant, M. W., X. Cai, and S. A. Cline. 2002. World water and food to 2025: Dealing 
with scarcity. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute 
and International Water Management Institute.
Rosegrant, M. W., S. Msangi, C. Ringler, T. B. Sulser, T. Zhu, and S. A. Cline. 2008. 
International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade 
(IMPACT):  Model  description.  Washington,  D.C.:  International  Food  Policy 
Research Institute. <http://www.ifpri.org/themes/impact/impactwater.pdf>. 
Accessed August 2010.
Smith, L., and L. Haddad. 2000. Explaining child malnutrition in developing countries: 
A cross-country analysis. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute.
Tobey, J., J. Reilly, and S. Kane. 1992. Economic implications of global climate change 
for world agriculture. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 17 (1): 
195-204.
United Nations. 2010. The Millennium development goals report, 2010. New York: 
United Nations.
You, L., and S. Wood. 2006. An entropy approach to spatial disaggregation of agricul-
tural production. Agricultural Systems 9 (1-3): 329-347.
Zavala, J. A., C. L. Casteel, E. H. DeLucia, and M. R. Berenbaum. 2008. Anthropogenic 
increase in carbon dioxide compromises plant defense against invasive insects. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (13): 5129-5133. <http://
www.pnas.org/content/105/13/5129.abstract>. Accessed August 2010.
122   REFERENCES123
About the Authors
Gerald C. Nelson is a senior research fellow in the Environment and Produc-
tion Technology Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.
Mark W. Rosegrant is the director of the Environment and Production Tech-
nology Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Amanda Palazzo is a senior research assistant in the Environment and Pro-
duction Technology Division of the International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C.
Ian Gray is a graduate student in the Department of Urban Studies and Plan-
ning, School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, Cambridge, U.S.A.
Christina Ingersoll is a graduate of the Sloan School of Management at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, U.S.A.
Richard Robertson is a research fellow in the Environment and Production 
Technology  Division  of  the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute, 
Washington, D.C.
Simla Tokgoz is a research fellow in the Environment and Production Tech-
nology Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Tingju Zhu is a senior scientist in the Environment and Production Technology 
Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
Timothy B. Sulser is a scientist in the Environment and Production Technology 
Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
Claudia Ringler is a senior research fellow in the Environment and Produc-
tion Technology Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.124   ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Siwa Msangi is a senior research fellow in the Environment and Production 
Technology  Division  of  the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute, 
Washington, D.C.
Liangzhi You is a senior research fellow in the Environment and Produc-
tion Technology Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.125
Index
Adaptation to climate change: challenges 
of, xv, 2; crop variety choices, 100; early 
action on, xi
AfSIS project, 88
Agricultural area: changes by region, 34t; 
changes in, 31–36; declines in, 35f; 
expansion of, xix, 35f
Agricultural-climate interactions: modeling, 
xvi. See also Climate change effects
Agricultural futures, modeling, 20. See also 
IFPRI Food Policy Report; IMPACT 2009 
modeling framework
Agricultural producers: adaptation to climate 
change, 2, 100; poverty rates of, 44n
Agricultural production/productivity: 
comparative advantages in, 38–39; 
determinants of, 12–13, 15; enhancing, xi; 
improvements, human well-being effects, 
56t; increases in, 23, 26–31; interregional 
adjustments for climate change effects, 
40; investments in, xv, xix, 1, 23; 
irrigation efficiency and, 110; modeling, 
106, 107; model outcomes, 36–38; overall 
improvements in, 52, 53t, 54f–55f; 
productivity improvement simulations, 23t
Agricultural sector, modeling, 3–5
Agricultural water use, definition of, 63n
Agronomic inputs, modeling methodology for, 
100–105
Animal feed, cassava root for, 62
Area growth rates (AGRs), exogenous, 31
Argentina maize production outcomes, 53
Asian Development Bank, 112
Average surface temperature outcomes, 11–12
Bangladesh: population increases, 115; rainfed 
crop area in drought situation, 80, 82f
Basin efficiency (BE), 110–11
Beneficial water consumption, changes in, 
72–73
Bennett’s Law, 42n
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 88
Biofuels production, 51n
Biophysical effects of climate change, 14–19
Biophysical-socioeconomic modeling, xvi, 3
Brazil: climate change productivity effects, 
62; crop area changes, 36; population 
increases, 115
Broad-based economic development, xvi–xvii
Calorie availability, 44; in developing 
countries, 49; income and climate 
mitigation and, xvii–xviii; malnourished 
children and, 47t, 48t; progress on, 49, 50f
Calories consumed: daily, 20; income and, 
38f–39f; of staple crops, 44, 45t
C3 and C4 crops, 14n, 99; CO2 fertilization 
effects, 104–5
Caribbean and Central America country group, 
90
Cassava: calories consumed from, 44, 45t; 
human well-being effects of productivity 
improvements, 63, 70t, 71t; international 
trade of, 62; IPRs of, 62, 67f; main 
producers of, 62; overall productivity, 
simulated, 55f; price effects of productivity 
improvements, 70t; price variations 
scenarios, 25f; productivity improvements, 
xx, 62–63; productivity improvements by 
region, 71t; South Asian drought effect on 
prices, 79f; world prices of, simulated, 55f; 
world prices of and maize productivity, 59f; 
world prices of and productivity, 69f; world 
prices of and wheat productivity, 65f; 
yield, changes in, 27t. See also Staple crops
Central Africa country group, 90
Central Asia country group, 91
Cereal exports: climate change effects on, 
xviii, 42; of developed countries, 50–51
Cereal grains, sensitivity to temperature 
change, 17n
CGIAR centers, partnerships across, 88
Child malnourishment: beyond 2050, 85; 
definition of, 108–9, 109n; determinants 
of, 44, 109; drought effects on, 78, 80, 
81t, 84f; economic development effects 
on, 46–47; efficiency improvement effects 
on, 56t; estimating, 109–10; non-calorie 
Page numbers for entries occurring in figures are suffixed by f, those for entries occurring in notes 
by n, and those for entries in tables by t.126   InDex
determinants of, 46, 46t; public sector 
investment effects on, 87; in RM10 vs. 
FPR09, 113t; wheat productivity and, 62. 
See also Human well-being
China: cassava imports, 62; crop area 
changes, 34; irrigation improvements 
and, 73, 75t; life expectancy changes, 46; 
population declines, 115; rice consumption 
changes, 39
Citizen data-gatherers, 88
Climate change: adaptation to, xi, xv, 2, 
100; biophysical effects of, 14–19; drivers 
of, 11–14; and food security, xi, 2; IPRs, 
and economic and demographic drivers, 
effects on yield, 27t–30t; linear changes in 
variables of, 100; perfect mitigation of, 87; 
plausible outcomes of, xvi; severity after 
2050, 85; and sustainable food production, 
xv; as threat multiplier, 87
Climate Change: Impact on Agriculture and 
Costs of Adaptation (IFPRI), xi
Climate change analysis, main messages of, 
xvi–xx
Climate change effects, xi; after 2050, 
xx–xxi; challenges beyond 2050, 85; child 
malnutrition, 44n; crop area changes, 36; 
crop calendar changes, 101–4; economic 
development and, xviii; on food security, 
49–51, 50f; income growth, offsetting 
with, 49–50; international trade and, xviii–
xix; manageability of, 86, 88; modeling 
in IMPACT model, 106–9; modeling 
system changes, 115–16; on poverty, 
44n; precipitation changes, 63; regional 
variability, 14; RM10 vs. IFPRI Food Policy 
Report results, 112–19; trade flows as 
adjustment mechanism, 40; trade policy 
and, 40; uncertainty about, 11, 13
Climate data, approximating, 99–100
Climate futures, xvi
Climate modeling, xi, 98
Climate realization, 15
Climate-specific investments, 87
Climate variability, perspectives on, xvi
CO2 emissions, 13; plants, effects on, 14n
CO2 fertilization, 14n, 104–5
Commodities. See IMPACT commodities; 
Staple crops
Commodity demand, 106
Common Agricultural Policy of the european 
Union, 62
Comparative advantage of crop production, 
38–39; trade policy effects and, 40
Consumption: interregional adjustments 




Crop area harvested, 31n; changes in, 34t, 
107
Crop calendars, climate change effects on, 
101–4, 107
Crop modeling, 98–99
Crop modeling code, 116
Crop prices, 20. See also World prices
Crop productivity: cassava improvements, 
62–63; increases in, simulations of, 52–63; 
maize improvements, 52–60; wheat 
improvements, 60–62. See also Agricultural 
production/productivity
Crops, beneficial irrigation water consumption 
of, 74t
Crop varieties, modeling, 100
Daily climate data, approximating, 99–100
Daily weather data, generating, 99
Data sources for modeling, improving, 88
Decision Support System for Agrotechnology 
Transfer (DSSAT) crop modeling 
software suite, 6, 14, 98; climate data, 
approximating, 99–100; CO2 fertilization 
effects, 104–5; crop modeling, 98–99; 
crop varieties, 100; five-crop analysis, 
105; hydrological module, 107; 
nitrogen application options, 105; soil 
characteristics, representing, 100
Demand for food, xi; determining, 20; 
increases in, xv
Democratic Republic of the Congo: climate 
change productivity effects, 62; population 
increases, 115
Demographic drivers, climate change, IPRs, 
and economic drivers, effects on yield, 
27t–30t
Developed countries, 90; cereal trade, 
42, 43f; staple crop export and import 
scenarios, 40; yield decreases in, 52
Developing countries, 89–90; calorie 
availability in, 44, 49; calories consumed 
rank order, 44, 45t; cassava consumption, 
62; cassava productivity simulation, 63; 
cereal trade, 42; child malnutrition, non-
calorie determinants of, 46, 46t; child 
malnutrition in, 46–47; commodity crops, 
calories consumed from, 45t; outcomes for, 
xvii–xviii; productivity improvements, 52; 
wheat consumption, 62; wheat productivity 
improvements, 60, 61f
Diet diversity, and income levels, 42n
Dimes, John, 100
Drought simulation, South Asian, 78–84InDex   127   
east Asia: beneficial water consumption 
changes, 72–73; country group, 91; 
irrigation in, xx
eastern Africa country group, 90
eastern europe country group, 91
economic country groupings, 89–90
economic crisis, effects on poverty and 
hunger, 1
economic development: child malnutrition, 
effects on, 46–47; climate change effects 
and, xviii; food security, effects on, 49–51, 
50f; human well-being, importance to, 49
economic downturn, and fossil fuel emissions, 
11
economic drivers, climate change, IPRs, and 
demographic drivers, effects on yield, 
27t–30t
Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, 
Volume 2 (Millennium ecosystem 
Assessment), 2
effective irrigation efficiency: definition of, 
63n. See also Irrigation efficiency
emissions growth, slowing, 86
european Union, cassava imports, 62
evapotranspiration: irrigation efficiency and, 
63n; modeling, 107
exogenous area growth rates, 31
exports, agricultural: changes in, 40n; climate 
change effects on, xviii; South Asian 
drought effects on, 80, 83f
extreme weather events, 78
FACe experiments, 14n
FAOSTAT, 31n
Feedstock for biofuels, 51n
Floods in Pakistan, xi, xv, 1
Food availability, determinants of, xvii
Food prices: as indicator of future of 
agriculture, xvii, 20. See also World prices
Food price spike of 2008, xv, 1
Food production: climate change effects on, 
xi; Green Revolution increases, xv. See also 
Agricultural production/productivity
Food production units (FPUs), 7f, 106, 106f; 
aggregation scheme for, 108
Food riots, 1
Food security: broad-based economic 
development and, xvi–xvii; challenges to 
achieving, 87; climate change effects on, 
xi, 2, 49–51, 50f; economic development 
effects on, 49–51, 50f; international trade 
and, 87
Fossil fuel CO2 emissions, 11–13; modeling 
scenarios, 13f; slowing, 86
Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC), 92; models 
used in, 92n
Future climate scenarios, crop growth under, 
xi
FutureClim dataset, 116




GDP. See Gross domestic product (GDP)
General circulation models (GCMs), 11; 
climate outputs of, 12; global summary 
statistics, 12, 15t
Geographic country groupings, 89–90
Ghana: cassava productivity improvement 
effects, 63; climate change productivity 
effects, 62
Global computable equilibrium (CGe) models, 
4–5
Global food security: challenges to, xi, 1; 
threatened future, xv
Grain embargoes: in Russia, xi, xv, 1
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: general 
circulation models, 11; pathways for, 
11–13; representative concentration 
pathways of, 11n
Green Revolution, xv, 1
Gross domestic product (GDP): in 2050, 
10; acreage scenario growth rates, 93t; 
comparisons across scenarios, 92; growth 
rate scenarios, 7–8; in IMPACT model, 7–8; 
per capita growth rates by region, 9t; RM10 
vs. FPR09 data, 113, 114t
Human-environment interactions, 
understanding, 88
Human well-being: broad-based economic 
development and, xvi–xvii; calorie 
availability, xvii–xviii; cassava productivity 
improvement effects, 63, 70t, 71t; 
determinants of, 44, 46; economic 
development, importance to, 49; efficiency 
improvement effects, 56t; irrigation 
efficiency improvement effects, 73, 75t; 
maize productivity improvement effects, 
60t; metrics for, 108–9; model outcomes, 
44–48; South Asian drought effects on, 78, 
81t, 84f; wheat productivity improvement 
effects, 62. See also Child malnourishment
Hunger, eradicating, 1
IFPRI Food Policy Report, 112; climate data, 
116–17; crop modeling code, 116; crop 
varieties, 117; geographic details, 118–19; 
planting dates, 117–18; soil conditions, 118; 
vs. climate change report results (RM10), 
112–19; water management, 118128   InDex
IMPACT commodities: calories consumed from, 
44, 45t; cassava consumption, 62
IMPACT 2009 modeling framework, 6–7, 
6f, 105–6; agricultural area changes, 
31–36; basin efficiency, 110; Bennett’s 
Law effects, 42n; biophysical effects of 
climate change, 14–19; calorie availability 
data, 109; climate change drivers, 11–14; 
climate change effects, modeling, 106–9; 
crop calendars, 101–4; crop modeling 
code, 116; GDP and population choices, 
7–8, 8t; income and population drivers, 
7–11; modeling methodology, 20, 98–111; 
modeling system improvements, 112, 
115–16; period of focus, 85; production 
changes, 36–38; real income change, 
effects on child malnutrition, 44n; spatial 
aggregation issues, 108; unit of analysis, 
106
Imports, agricultural: climate change effects 
on, 42; South Asian drought effects on, 80, 
83f
Income: calories consumed and, 38f–39f; 
disparities, xx, 85; and population growth 
combinations, xvi, 3; resilience and, xvi–
xvii; world per capita income, 10–11
Income drivers, 7–11
Income growth: climate change offset of, 
49–50; human well-being and, 49; per 
capita, 42n; staple crops, effects on 
consumption of, 42n
India: crop area changes, 34; irrigation 
improvements and, 73, 75t; population 
increases, 115; rainfed crop area in drought 
situation, 80, 82f
Indonesia: cassava productivity improvement 
effects, 63; climate change productivity 
effects, 62
Industrial CO2 emissions, 13
Integrated assessment models (IAMs), 11n
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) assessment reports, 11n 
International trade: climate change effects 
and, xviii–xix, 50–51; climate model effects, 
42; drought simulation and, 80; model 
outcomes, 38–44; remedial role of, 87; of 
staple crops, 41t
Intrinsic area growth rate, 108
Intrinsic productivity growth rates (IPRs): 
adjustments of, 52; for cassava productivity 
simulation, 62, 67f; climate change, 
and economic and demographic drivers, 
effects on yield, 27t–30t; development and 
updating of, 26; for maize productivity 
simulation, 57f; for rice, 26f; for wheat 
productivity simulation, 61f
Intrinsic yield growth coefficient, 106
Investments in agricultural productivity, 23, 
26, 87; in Russia, 44
Investments in infrastructure, 23, 26
Irrigated crops: crop planting month, 101, 
102, 103f–104f; expansion in, 80, 82f; 
relative importance of by region, 63, 71t; 
rice irrigation, 63, 72; staple crops share, 
71t, 72; water consumption by month, 
72, 72f; water shortages and, 63; water 
stress effects, 105, 107; water use in 2050, 
76f–78f; yields, changes in, 26–31
Irrigation efficiency: benefits of 
improvements, 73, 75t; definition of, 63n; 
human well-being effects of improvements 
in, 73, 75t; improvements in, xx, 63–78, 
110–11; price effects of improvements in, 
73, 74t
Japan, rice consumption changes, 39
Kazakhstan: meat consumption in, 43; wheat 
production and export, 43
Koo, Jawoo, 100
Land productivity, Green revolution increases, 
xv
Life expectancy, changes in, 46
Living Standards Measurement Study-
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture, 88
Low-income developing countries and country 
groups, 89
Maize: calories consumed from, 44, 45t; 
exogenous AGRs for, 33f; exports 
scenarios, 40; human well-being 
effects of productivity improvements, 
60t; international prices of, 21t, 22f; 
international trade of, 42; IPRs for, 57f; 
irrigated hectares of, 80, 82f; irrigation 
of, 72; main producers of, 52–53; overall 
productivity, simulated, 54f; price effects 
of productivity improvements, 56, 60t; 
price increases, xvii; price variations 
scenarios, 24f; production changes, 36, 
36t; production in drought scenario, 80; 
productivity improvements, 52–60; South 
Asian drought effect on prices, 79f, 80t; 
U.S. production of, 42, 43t; world prices 
of, simulated, 53, 54f; world prices of and 
cassava productivity, 68f; world prices of 
and productivity, 58f; world prices of and 
wheat productivity, 64f; yield, changes in, 
27t; yield increases, xix. See also Staple 
cropsInDex   129   
Malnourished children, xvii–xviii; in 2050, 
xx; calorie availability and, 47t, 48t; 
decreases in, 52; estimating numbers 
of, 44; as indicator, 20. See also Child 
malnourishment
Malnourished people, number of, 1
Malnutrition, definition of, 108–9, 109n
MarkSim, 94
Meat: consumption in Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine, 43; consumption of, 42n; prices 
of, simulated, 56
Middle east country group, 91
Middle-income developing countries and 
country groups, 89
Millennium ecosystem Assessment (MA), 2; 
GDP scenarios, 8; price scenarios, 20–21, 
21t; scenarios, 21
Mitigation, early action on, xi
Modeling: agricultural futures, 20; data 
sources, 88; of environment, 3–5; 
methodology of, 98–111
Modeling scenarios, xvi
Model outcomes, indicators of, 20
Monsoon failures, 78
net trade, 20. See also International trade
nigeria: climate change productivity effects, 
62; crop area changes, 36
north America country group, 90
northern Africa country group, 90
northern europe country group, 91
nutrient levels in soil, modeling, 105
Oceania country group, 91
Oils: calories consumed from, 44, 45t; 
consumption of, 42n
Open world trade system, xi
Pakistan: floods in, xi, xv, 1; irrigation 
improvements and, 73, 75t; population 
declines, 115; rainfed crop area in drought 
situation, 80, 82f
Partial equilibrium (Pe) agricultural models, 
xvi, 3–4, 105
Per capita income growth, 42n
Perfect climate mitigation, xvi, 87; food 
prices and, xvii
Planting dates, 101–4, 117–18
Plants, sensitivity to CO2 emissions, 14n, 104–5
Plausible outcomes, xvi
Population drivers, 7–11
Population growth, 85, 115; comparisons 
across scenarios, 92; pace of, xx. See also 
World population
Potatoes, yield changes, 28t
Poverty: climate change effects on, 44n; 
eradicating, 1
Precipitation: agricultural productivity, 
effects on, 12–13, 15; changes in, 14, 16f; 
changes in by region, 94t–97t; rainfall-
runoff process, 107; temperature increases 
and, 13–14; water availability and, 105
Price effects: of irrigation efficiency 
improvements, 73, 74t; RM10 vs. FPR09, 
113t; of South Asian drought scenarios, 78, 
79f, 80t. See also World prices
Prices. See Food prices; World prices
Price spikes of 2008 and 2010, 87
Production changes, 36–38. See also 
Agricultural production/productivity
Productivity improvement simulations, 23t
Public sector investments: climate-specific 
and supporting investments, 87–88; effects 
of, 87
Qualitative and quantitative scenarios, 2
Rainfed crops: crop planting month, 101, 
101f–102f; progression in drought situation, 
80, 82f; yields, changes in, 26–31
Rainy seasons, 101
Real agricultural prices, increases in, xvii
Regional groupings, 89–91
Regional variability, 14
Region-specific A2 climate scenario summary 
statistics, 94t–97t
Representative concentration pathways (RCPs) 
of GHG emissions, 11n 
Research expenditures, effects on crop 
productivity, 26
Resilience, and income, xvi–xvii
Resource allocation, 4
Resource scarcity, increases in, 20
Rice: calories consumed from, 44, 45t; 
consumption patterns, 39, 42; exogenous 
AGRs for, 32f; imports scenarios, 40; 
international prices of, 21t; international 
trade of, 40–42; intrinsic productivity 
growth rates for, 26f; irrigated hectares of, 
80, 82f; irrigation efficiency improvements, 
benefits to, 73; irrigation of, 63, 72; 
overall productivity, simulated, 54f; 
price increases, xvii; price variations 
scenarios, 24f; production changes, 37t, 38; 
production in drought scenario, 83f; South 
Asian drought effect on prices, 79f, 80t; 
water management for, 118; world prices 
of, simulated, 53, 54f; world prices of and 
cassava productivity, 68f; world prices of 
and maize productivity, 58f; world prices of 
and wheat productivity, 64f; yield, changes 130   InDex
in, 28t–29t; yield increases, 52. See also 
Staple crops
RM10 (IFPRI research monograph): climate 
data, 116–17; crop modeling code, 116; 
crop varieties, 117; geographic details, 118–
19; planting dates, 117–18; soil conditions, 
118; water management, 118. See also 
IMPACT 2009 modeling framework
Runoff, modeling, 107
Russia: heat and drought in, xi, xv, 1; meat 
consumption in, 43; wheat production and 
export, 43
Scenarios: definition of, 2; development 
of, 2; income and population growth 
combinations, 3
Seasonal patterns, changes in, 14
SIMMeTeO software, 99
Simulations: cassava productivity, 62–63; 
choosing, 20; crop productivity increases, 
52–63; irrigation efficiencies improvements, 
63–78; maize productivity, 52–60; policy 
and program innovations, 3; South Asian 
drought, 78–84; wheat productivity, 60–62. 
See also IMPACT 2009 modeling framework
Soil characteristics: modeling, 100, 118; 
water availability and, 105; water-holding 
capacity, 107
Sorghum: international prices of, 22f; yield, 
changes in, 29t
South America country group, 90
South Asia: beneficial water consumption 
changes, 72–73; country group, 91; 
irrigation efficiencies, xx
South Asian drought simulation, xviii–xix, 
78–84; exports and imports effects, 80, 
83f; human well-being effects, 78, 81t, 
84f; irrigated and rainfed area changes, 80, 
82f; rainfed crop area progression, 80, 82f; 
staple crop production effects, 80, 83f; 
world price effects, 78, 79f, 80t
Southeast Asia country group, 91
Southern Africa country group, 90
Southern europe country group, 91
Soybean, changes in yield, 29t–30t
SPAM dataset, 6; crop location and 
management techniques, 98, 99f
Spatial aggregation, 108
Spring wheat crop calendar, 101–2, 104
SReS scenarios, 92
Staple crops: beneficial irrigation water 
consumption of, 74t; calories consumed 
from, 44, 45t; consumption of, 38f, 39f; 
exogenous growth rates, 32f–33f; income 
growth effects on consumption, 42n; 
international prices of, 21t; international 
trade of, 41t; irrigated share of, 71t, 72; 
price changes, 23t, 24f–25f; price effects 
in RM10 vs. FPR09, 113t; price effects of 
efficiency improvements, 56t, 60t, 66t, 
70t; price effects of wheat productivity 
improvements, 66t; production outcomes, 
36t–37t; productivity growth rates, 26f; 
South Asian drought effect on prices, 79f, 
80t; U.S. prices of, 22f; yield, climate 
change effects on, 18f–19f; yield, combined 
effects on, 27t–30t; yield outcomes, 
simulated, 53t, 54f–55f. See also Cassava; 
Maize; Rice; Wheat
Sugar, calories consumed from, 44, 45t
Supply: and demand, imbalances in, 20; 
determining, 20
Surface air temperature increases, xx
Sustainable development, xi
Sustainable food production: challenges to 
progress, 87; climate change and, xv; 
irrigation efficiency and, 63; pressures on, 
xv, 1
Tanzania, population declines, 115
Technology dissemination, 23, 26
Temperature: agricultural productivity, 
effects on, 12–13, 15; changes in by 
region, 94t–97t; increases in, 11–12, 12f; 
precipitation increases and, 13–14
Thailand: cassava productivity improvement 
effects, 63; climate change productivity 
effects, 62
Thornton/Jones downscaling methodology, 
116–17
Trade flows: offsetting climate change 
effects, xviii. See also International trade
Trade policy effects, comparative advantage 
of crop production and, 40
2010 Millennium Development Goals report, 1
Ukraine: meat consumption in, 43; wheat 
production and export, 43
Uncertainty related to temperature and 
precipitation, 12–14
United States: maize production, 42, 43t; 
wheat exports, 44
Water availability, 105
Water availability coefficient, 107
Water management, 118
Water scarcity, 63
Water use: beneficial irrigation by crop, 74t; 
in 2050 for irrigation, 76f–78f. See also 
Irrigated crops; Irrigation efficiency
Website, companion, 3
Western Africa country group, 90InDex   131   
Western europe country group, 91
Wheat: calories consumed from, 44, 45t; 
climate change impacts in 2030, 2050, 
2080, 85, 85t; exports scenarios, 40; 
human well-being effects of productivity 
improvements, 62, 66t; international prices 
of, 21t, 22f; international trade of, 42; 
irrigated hectares of, 80, 82f; irrigation of, 
72; main producers of, 60, 61f; modeling 
production of, 117; overall productivity, 
simulated, 55f; price effects of productivity 
improvements, 66t; price variations 
scenarios, 25f; production and export from 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 43; production 
changes, 37t, 38; production in drought 
scenario, 83f; productivity improvements, 
xix, 60–62; rainfed and irrigated, 72; 
South Asian drought effect on prices, 79f, 
80t; spring wheat crop calendar, 101–2, 
104; U.S. exports, 44; world prices of, 
simulated, 53, 55f; world prices of and 
maize productivity, 59f; world prices of 
and productivity, 65f, 69f; yield, changes 
in, 30t; yield effects, rainfed, 19f; yield 
increases, 52; yields in 2030, 2050, 2080, 
xxi. See also Staple crops
Wildfires, xi, xv, 1
WorldClim: climate data, 94, 116; current 
conditions dataset, 99
World per capita income, 10–11
World population, xi, xv; in 2050, 10t; growth 
rate scenarios, 8–9f; in IMPACT model, 7–8; 
increases in, 115; RM10 vs. FPR09 data, 
114, 115t
World prices: of cassava, 62–63; increases in, 
21–23, 52; modeling, 20–23, 106; overall 
model outcomes, 23t; price spikes of 2008 
and 2010, 87; South Asian drought effects 
on, 78, 79f, 80t; of staples, simulated, 53
Yield: altering for modeling, 106–7; 
biophysical effects of climate change on, 
15, 17t, 19f; climate change effects on in 
2030, 2050, 2080, 85, 85t; CO2 fertilization 
effects, 105; model outcomes, 23–31; 
sources of change, 23, 26; temperature 
and, 12–13, 15Gerald C. Nelson, Mark W. Rosegrant, Amanda Palazzo, Ian Gray, 
Christina Ingersoll, Richard Robertson, Simla Tokgoz, Tingju Zhu, 
Timothy B. Sulser, Claudia Ringler, Siwa Msangi, and Liangzhi You
As the global population grows and incomes in poor 
countries rise, so too, will the demand for food, placing additional pres-
sure on sustainable food production. Climate change adds a further chal-
lenge, as changes in temperature and precipitation threaten agricultural 
productivity and the capacity to feed the world’s population. This study 
assesses how serious the danger to food security might be and suggests 
some steps policymakers can take to remedy the situation. 
Using various modeling techniques, the authors project 15 different 
future scenarios for food security through 2050. Each scenario involves 
an alternative combination of potential population and income growth 
and climate change. The authors also examine the specific test case of a 
hypothetical extended drought in South Asia, to demonstrate the possible 
effects of increased climate variability on a particular world region. They 
conclude that the negative effects of climate change on food security can 
be counteracted by broad-based economic growth—particularly improved 
agricultural productivity—and robust international trade in agricultural 
products to offset regional shortages. In pursuit of these goals, policymak-
ers should increase public investment in land, water, and nutrient use and 
maintain relatively free international trade. This inquiry into the future of 
food security should be of use to policymakers and others concerned with 
the impact of climate change on international development.
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